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PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS,
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, AND THE ECONOMIC
DURESS DEFENSE: A CRITIQUE OF THREE
COMMENTARIES
STEVEN W. FELDMAN
ABSTRACT
Arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is the most important topic
in current contract law and commentary. The Supreme Court has issued eight merits
decisions construing the FAA since 2011, the lower state and federal courts issued
more than 1,000 decisions considering the FAA in 2014, and there were 81 fulllength articles, notes, and comments on arbitration in the same year.
Recently, three commentators, Professor Margaret Jane Radin of the University
of Michigan Law School, Professor Nancy S. Kim of the California Western School
of Law, and former Lecturer in Law James P. Dawson of the Yale Law School, have
proposed the use of an expanded economic duress defense to help consumers combat
unfair pre-dispute arbitration agreements. This Article summarizes each
commentator’s position and identifies my concerns. While such arbitration clauses
can sometimes be unfair, all three proposals are flawed on numerous grounds. The
primary problem is that the authors’ revised duress doctrines draw unworkable
distinctions between improper coercion of offerees and legitimate bargaining
techniques in a free market society.
My analysis is the first in the legal literature that comprehensively discusses the
connection between the economic duress defense generally and FAA arbitration
specifically. As I will demonstrate, the two subject areas emphasize freedom of
contract as they promote the necessary certainty and predictability of contractual
relations. Thus, they accomplish the proper balance between binding the buyer to the
arbitral process he agreed to in the contract and prohibiting the seller from enforcing
a bargain if he procured it through unduly coercive tactics.

 Attorney-Advisor, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Huntsville, Alabama. Thanks to
Professors Christopher Drahozal, David Horton, David Friedman, Jean Sternlight, and Ken
Ching for their excellent insights and suggestions. Thanks especially to my wife, Dr. Gayla
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INTRODUCTION
Arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)1 is the most important topic
in current contract law and commentary. The Supreme Court has issued eight merits
1

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012).
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decisions interpreting the FAA since 2011.2 In 2014, state and federal courts issued
well over 1,000 decisions considering the FAA.3 Further, in 2014 scholars wrote
eighty-one full-length articles, notes and comments on arbitration. Recently, three
commentators—Professor Margaret Jane Radin, Professor Nancy S. Kim, and
former Lecturer in Law James P. Dawson—each proposed the use of an expanded
economic duress defense to help consumers combat what the authors believe to be
unfair pre-dispute arbitration clauses.4 This Article summarizes each commentator’s
position, provides my concerns about their proposals, and suggests an overarching
theory for the legal doctrine of economic duress under the FAA.
Even though Radin, Kim, and Dawson wish to “expand” the economic duress
defense, all three authors couch their proposals in the traditional terminology of
economic duress: coercion, oppression, the offeror’s wrongful acts, and the offeree’s
absence of reasonable alternatives.5 While differing in some of the details, the three
proposals have striking parallels. Each author contends (1) true assent is lacking in
these adhesion contracts; (2) companies are exploiting consumers; and (3) traditional
notions of duress should be “expanded” to protect “vulnerable” consumers because
of their need for the relevant product or service.6
Because each author relies to an extent on current economic duress doctrine, it is
fair to analyze whether each proposal meets foundational legal standards. This
Article in no way criticizes the three commentators for expanding existing law. My
2 BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014); Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct.
2064 (2013); Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012); Marmet Health Care
Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665
(2012); KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23 (2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
3 State courts considering challenges to an arbitration agreement must apply the FAA to a
transaction involving interstate commerce. See, e.g., Frizzell Constr. Co. v. Gatlinburg, LLC,
9 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tenn. 1999) (“[T]he provisions of the FAA are to be applied in both state
and federal courts”) (citing decisions). While this Article focuses on the FAA, almost all states
have their own arbitration statutes. See Stephen Wills Murphy, Note, Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards Under State Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 887, 890 (2010). A number of states
recognize duress as an enforcement defense under state arbitration requirements. E.g., St.
Fleur v. WPI Cable Sys./Mutron, 879 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Mass. 2008); Moore v. Woman to
Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, LLC, 3 A.3d 535, 539 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010);
Hill v. NHC Healthcare/Nashville, LLC, No. M2005–01818–COA–R3–CV, 2008 WL
1901198, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2008).
4 MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS AND, THE
RULE OF LAW (2013); Nancy S. Kim, Situational Duress and the Aberrance of Electronic
Contracts, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265 (2014); James P. Dawson, Comment, Contract After
Concepcion: Some Lessons from the State Courts, 124 YALE L.J. 233 (2014).
5 RADIN, supra note 4, at 15, 20, 123, 151; Kim, supra note 4, at 266, 276-78, 282;
Dawson, supra note 4, at 234-35, 243.
6

RADIN, supra note 4, at 5, 20, 93-95,151-52; Kim, supra note 4, at 266, 271 n.32, 27786; Dawson, supra note 4, at 240-45. For the earliest analysis of duress and arbitration, see
Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute Resolution or Coercive
Dispute Suppression? 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131, 153 (1996) (“[T]he threat of
unemployment in many cases will induce employees to agree to compulsory arbitration
regardless of their opposition to the policy and thus will constitute duress.”).
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primary concern is that their proposals draw unworkable distinctions between
legitimate free market bargaining techniques and improper coercion of offerees. My
analysis will show that Radin, Kim, and Dawson deviate in numerous and prejudicial
ways from well-settled and carefully balanced legal principles governing the
economic duress defense. I will combine this doctrinal assessment of their proposals
with a normative critique of their expansions of the economic duress defense. In
providing this analysis, I acknowledge the extensive commentary criticizing (or
defending) the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence7 and that a pre-dispute
arbitration clause can sometimes be unfair.
Besides assessing the three commentators’ suggestions, this Article operates on a
deeper level that can assist scholars, bench, and bar. This Article is the first in the
legal literature that comprehensively discusses the intersection between the FAA and
the economic duress defense. The positive theme I propose is that the economic
duress defense and the FAA emphasize freedom of contract and help solidify the
certainty and predictability of contractual relations. I use the three proposals as a
vehicle for showing why current law is fair and effective. Thus, the economic duress
defense works well as courts accomplish the proper balance between binding the
offeree to the arbitral process agreed to in the contract and prohibiting the offeror
from enforcing a bargain procured through unduly coercive tactics.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I summarizes each author’s reform.
Part II shows how the FAA preempts the authors’ particular duress formulation as a
challenge to contractual arbitration. Part III demonstrates how the authors’ suggested
revamping of economic duress doctrine would impair freedom of contract and
destabilize the predictability and certainty of contract, especially consumer
agreements.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE THREE PROPOSALS
A. Radin’s Proposal
Margaret Jane Radin, the Henry King Ransom Professor of Law at the University
of Michigan and the William Benjamin Scott and Luna M. Scott Professor of Law,
Emerita, at Stanford University, is the author of Boilerplate: The Fine Print,
Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law.8 Her book received high praise from most
commentators, earning such plaudits as “groundbreaking,”9 “a great achievement,”
“eloquent and powerful,”10 and a “masterpiece.”11

7 E.g., Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a
Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 (2006); Jean
R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just? 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005).
Compare Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a
Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195 (1998) (defending
the Court’s approach), with Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration:
Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP.
RESOL. 469, 480 (2006) (“There is reason to believe that arbitration clauses lower the contract
price of the goods, services, or money, or provide weaker parties with more advantageous
terms, because arbitration reduces the parties’ joint costs of contracting.”).
8

RADIN, supra note 4.

9

Hugh J. Treacy, Book Review, in Benjamin J. Keele & Nick Sexton, Keeping Up with
New Legal Titles, 105 L. LIBR. J. 369, 376-77 (2013) (“[W]e now have a thoughtfully crafted
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In Boilerplate, Radin observes that the legal system must contrast consent with
non-consent with regard to a person’s allegedly “agreed-upon” transfer of
entitlements.12 She contends that a principal type of non-consent is “coercion and its
allied conceptions of force and duress” and that one “controversial” aspect of duress
and coercion in the field of contracts is economic duress.13
Radin heavily criticizes mass market mandatory arbitration clauses as a
prominent example of what she calls an improper “boilerplate rights deletion
scheme.”14 She believes that these clauses deprive “large numbers of people both of
their right to jury trial and their right to aggregative remedies (either class actions or
classwide arbitration).”15 In this respect, Radin argues that the indigent are the
powerless victims of these duplicitous practices.
She further poses the dilemma poor people would face if the law invalidated
these oppressive rights deletion schemes. In colorful language, Radin argues that the
poor would have to elect between the “frying pan” and “the fire.”16 “The frying pan
is [the consumer] being deprived of rights without consent; the fire is [the consumer]
being deemed unable to enter into enforceable contracts.”17 In Radin’s opinion, it is
doubtful that the recipient exercises free choice with these transactions.18
Accordingly, Radin believes that the law must enhance the traditional regulatory
measures for abusive merchant practices.19 One such regulatory measure in need of
reform, according to her, is economic duress.

work of scholarship that will challenge readers to achieve new understandings of contract law
within our print and electronic boilerplate world. . . . [I]t is a groundbreaking work.”).
10

Oren Bar-Gill, Boilerplate Symposium VII: Oren Bar-Gill on Consent Without Reading,
LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: CONTRACTSPROFBLOG (May 21, 2013),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2013/05/boilerplate-symposium-viioren-bar-gill-on-consent-without-reading-.html (“Professor Radin’s book is an eloquent and
powerful critique of the fine-term, boilerplate contracts that pervade modern life. . . . Radin’s
book is a great achievement.”).
11

David Horton, Mass Arbitration and Democratic Legitimacy, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 459,
464 (2013) (“dense and sprawling masterpiece”); see also Theresa Amato, Boilerplate
Symposium II: Theresa Amato on Remedies to the Problems Posed by Boilerplate, LAW
PROFESSOR
BLOGS
NETWORK:
CONTRACTSPROFBLOG
(May
14,
2013),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2013/05/boilerplate-symposium-iitheresa-amato-on-remedies-to-the-problems-posed-by-boilerplate.html (“Professor Radin's
masterpiece Boilerplate sets forth the intellectual underpinnings for an energetic movement to
correct the imbalance of power between corporations and consumers in fine print contracts.”).
12

RADIN, supra note 4, at 20.

13

Id. at 20, 123, 150-51, 275-76 nn.2 & 3 (discussing the economic duress defense).

14

Id. at 35.

15

Id. at 130.

16

Id. at 150.

17

Id.

18

Id. at 150-51.

19

Id. at 150-53.
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Regarding economic duress, Radin notes that the law is unclear on what types of
choices arise from consent or coercion.20 She indicates that the easy cases are when
the actor threatens the victim with physical harm if he does not accede to the actor’s
desires — “[y]our money or your life” — but she says most circumstances are not so
clear-cut.21 She further indicates whether a choice represents true volition is open to
dispute.22 “[S]ufficiently exploitive” terms, Radin believes, can still be coercive and
unenforceable even where the victim manifests assent to the wrongdoer.23 She posits
that the law must clearly define coercive terms and explain which fact situations
support a finding of economic duress.24
As a remedy for improper arbitration clauses, she proposes refocusing economic
duress from “expectation” to “exploitation.”25 Radin explains that “[r]ecipients
could theoretically . . . invoke some species of duress when presented with take-itor-leave it boilerplate in acquiring a necessity of life . . . .”26 But at the same time,
she contends that “[t]hese traditional doctrines were in the past interpreted quite
narrowly by the courts.”27
B. Kim’s Proposal
Nancy S. Kim is Professor of Law and ProFlowers Distinguished Professor of
Internet Studies at the California Western School of Law and the author of Wrap
Contacts: Foundations and Ramifications,28 which examines how electronic
contracts impact society and control consumer behavior. Reviewers have called her
book “provocative, thoroughly researched with terrific references, and very
stimulating.”29
In an article that replicates her points in Wrap Contracts, Kim considers massmarket consumer electronic contracts to be a “particularly virulent strain of aberrant
contract.”30 Kim sees these contracts as unfair in “their form, their medium, and
their content,” which creates extra perils for consumers beyond conventional paper
contracts.31
More specifically, Kim argues at length that these contracts exploit consumers in
several ways. First, they foster confusion because merchants promulgate them in
various modes and thereby cause uncertainty because consumers do not understand
20

Id. at 151.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 275 n.2 (internal punctuation omitted).

27

Id.

28

NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS (2013).

29

Frederic H. Marienthal, Book Review, 43 COLO. LAW. 108, 108 (2014).

30

Kim, supra note 4, at 265.

31

Id.
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the terms.32 Second, websites can be deceptively consumer-friendly, such that a
mere click of the mouse can form a contract. 33 The use of hyperlinks in electronic
contracts, she believes, is often a trap for the unwary.34 Further, Kim attacks the
practice in which merchants reserve the right to make unilateral contract
modifications where the consumer “accepts” the changed term by continuing to
access or receive services after the revisions become effective.35 Kim indicates that
it is even more unfair where the consumer will be deemed bound by his failure to
actively reject the contract after receiving notice of the terms, such as with
browsewraps.36
Kim believes companies take gross advantage of consumers’ well-known
proclivity to accept the terms without reading them, even when the terms are onesided in favor of the merchant and often oppressive to the consumer.37 Thus, Kim
contends that the common-law duty to read a contract—which binds the offeree
regardless of his understanding or acknowledgement of the terms—should apply
with less force in electronic contracting.38 The reasons she offers for abrogating this
duty are the sheer mass of material in electronic contracts and the pervasive use of
hyperlinks. According to Kim, “[t]oday, a consumer is practically unable to engage
in any online activity without being forced to accept the terms of an electronic
contract.”39
To counteract merchants that misuse electronic contracts to exploit consumers,
Kim proposes an “expanded” duress defense, which she calls “situational duress.”40
To prevail in a claim for contract avoidance, the consumer must show the drafting
company made an improper threat leaving the consumer with no reasonable
alternative.41 Where the consumer meets its burden of proof, the contract would be
void and not merely voidable as under current law.42
This situational duress defense does not cover all instances of electronic
contracting:
Rather, the defense should be used in the electronic contracting context if
(1) a drafting company uses an electronic contract to block consumer

32

Id.

33

Kim observes that as compared with paper contracts, where consumers understand they
are entering into a contract when they sign, electronic contracts can leave the consumer “often
ignorant that any bargain has taken place.” Id. at 274.
34

Id. at 272.

35

Id. at 271.

36

Id. at 267.

37

Id. at 266.

38

Id. at 275-76.

39

Id. at 276.

40

Id. at 286-87.

41

Id. at 266.

42

Id.
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access to a product or service; (2) the consumer has a “vested interest”43
in that product or service; and (3) the consumer accepts the terms because
she was blocked from the product or service after attempting to reject or
decline them. In these situations, the consumer's action should not be
effective as a manifestation of assent and the contract should be void.44
Regarding the improper threat element in a contract avoidance claim, Kim says
the merchant “acts improperly or wrongfully by creating a situation that results in an
unfair choice: contract acceptance or forfeiture.”45 For Kim, this creates coercion
because “the company is threatening the consumer with the loss of something in
which she has a vested property or proprietorship interest.”46 She further explains
that the threat looms over the consumer because he or she has “no choice but to
accept the new or additional terms or forfeit her content and contracts.”47 As for the
element that the consumer has “no reasonable alternative” except to enter the
contract, the consumer must establish that he or she “attempted to decline or reject
the terms but was forced to accept them.”48 If the merchant makes it difficult for the
consumer to reject the electronic contract, she argues, that action renders the consent
coerced and the consumer has a valid defense of situational duress. 49
C. Dawson’s Proposal
James P. Dawson is a former Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School. He argues
for an expanded economic duress defense in arbitration cases in response to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.50 In Concepcion,
the Court held that the FAA preempts California's judicial rule permitting an
unconscionability defense that forecloses the consumer’s ability to bring a classwide remedy to an arbitration clause.51
Dawson observes that some state courts have read Concepcion narrowly to
remedy what he indicates is the Court’s brazenly “conservative” and “anticonsumer” approval of “forced arbitration” clauses.52 Applauding these state court
efforts, Dawson contends that additional “ambitious” and “innovative” remedies are
43

The consumer has a “vested interest” in the product or service when (1) the merchant
uses a “rolling contract,” (i.e., the merchant furnishes the consumer the terms after the
completion of the acts constituting offer and acceptance) or (2) the consumer is a “content
hostage,” (i.e., when the consumer uses a service that permits him to store content on the
company’s servers, such as Facebook or Twitter). Id. at 279-80.
44

Id.

45

Id. at 282.

46

Id.

47

Id. at 283.

48

Id. at 283-84.

49

Id. at 278, 279, 283.

50

Dawson, supra note 4 (analyzing AT &T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011)).
51

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).

52

Dawson, supra note 4, at 233.
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needed to “cabin” Concepcion and to assist state court judges in remaining the “final
arbiter” of state law.53
Dawson focuses on the economic duress defense as one antidote to Concepcion.
Under the FAA, duress is a generally applicable defense to the enforcement of an
arbitration agreement or clause.54 The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that a
party’s allegation of economic duress can be a viable basis under the FAA to
challenge an arbitration contract.55 Dawson proposes to “expand” the contract
defense of economic duress to make it easier to invalidate arbitration provisions. 56
In his view, current duress doctrine would be improved if it displayed more
sensitivity to “social inequality and context and included aggrieved parties’
experience and perspectives.”57
Dawson references one current common-law version of the duress defense in
which a “party with superior bargaining power committed a wrongful act, threatened
the party with inferior bargaining power, or otherwise engaged in oppressive or
coercive behavior.”58 Dawson’s replacement duress formulation is that “no valid
contract can be formed when an offeror proposes a take-it-or-leave-it deal requiring
the offeree to either (1) consent to a nonnegotiable contract clause requiring
arbitration of all disputes or else (2) forego something that a reasonable person
would deem necessary for modern life.” 59
53 Id. at 233-34. For similar criticisms, see Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703 (2012). Other
commentators have a more optimistic view of Concepcion. See Christopher R. Drahozal, FAA
Preemption After Concepcion, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 154 (2014) (“[A]t least
some of the preemption holdings courts have attributed to Concepcion are due, not to
Concepcion, but instead to well-established law predating Concepcion.”).
54 For a court to consider the duress defense to the enforcement of an arbitration clause,
the alleged coercion must relate specifically either to the arbitration clause rather than to the
contract as a whole or to both the arbitration clause and the overall contract. See Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967); Associated Elec. Co-op.,
Inc. v. International Broth. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 53, 751 F.3d 898, 905 (8th Cir. 2014);
Bilyeu v. Johanson Berenson LLP, 809 F. Supp. 2d 547, 552 (W.D. La. 2011) (analyzing
decisions). Otherwise, the arbitrator decides the issue of duress. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at
403–04; see also Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc., 751 F.3d at 905.
55 See, e.g., Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (“[9 U.S.C.§ 2] permits agreements to arbitrate
to be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their
meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”); Rent-A-Center, West, Inc.
v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010) (“Like other contracts, however, [arbitration agreements]
may be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability.’”); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)
(“[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be
applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening [the FAA].”).
56

Dawson, supra note 4, at 233-34.

57 Id. at 244 (quoting Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARVARD
J.L. & GENDER 171, 171 (2013)).
58

Id. at 243 (citing Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp, 797 F.2d 43, 57 (1st Cir. 1986); Fees
v. Mut. Fire & Auto Ins. Co., 490 N.W.2d 55, 58 (Iowa 1992)).
59

Id. at 242.
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Dawson contends that his proposal “remain[s] faithful to Supreme Court
precedent” based on the Court’s oft-repeated statement that arbitration is “a matter of
consent, not coercion.”60 Further, he believes that his proposal to expand economic
duress doctrine comports with the basic notion of the defense, which is whether “a
party with superior bargaining power has coerce[d] the other party to accept the
terms because of the latter’s severe economic necessity.”61
II. FAA PREEMPTION AND THE PROPOSALS FOR AN EXPANDED DURESS DEFENSE
Radin devotes some attention to FAA preemption62 but does not expressly
consider whether FAA preemption would impact her proposal. Kim does not raise
the possibility that the FAA could preempt her proposed reform. Although Dawson
asserts he wishes to “remain[ ] faithful to Supreme Court precedent”63 and
acknowledges the FAA rule of preemption,64 Dawson also does not analyze whether
his expanded duress defense would survive FAA preemption. The following
discussion will explain why the FAA would preempt all three authors’ proposals.
A. FAA Overview and Preemption Principles
A “strong” public policy favors arbitration over litigation because arbitration is
expeditious, avoids litigation delays, relieves court congestion, and is more
economically efficient, for all parties, than a jury trial.65 Congress enacted the FAA
to execute this policy and overcome judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.66
Under the FAA, a written provision agreeing to settle by arbitration a controversy
arising out of a contract involving interstate commerce is “valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.”67 As part of this objective, Congress has protected arbitration
agreements by putting them on “an equal footing as compared with other
contracts.”68 The “equal footing” doctrine means that the FAA “does not favor or
elevate arbitration agreements to a level of importance above all other contracts; it
simply ensures that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their
terms.”69
60 Id. at 244 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681
(2010)).
61 Id. at 242 (quoting Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions
Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 KY. L.J. 1, 26-27 (2008)).
62

See RADIN, supra note 4, at 131-35, 278, 283.

63

Dawson, supra note 4, at 235.

64

Id. at 240.

65 E.g., Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 1993);
Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1186 (Cal. 1976).
66

See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011).

67

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (emphasis added).

68

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.

69

Kirby v. Lion Enters., Inc., 756 S.E.2d 493, 497-98 (W. Va. 2014) (quoting State ex rel.
Richmond Am. Homes of W. Va., Inc. v. Sanders, 717 S.E.2d 909, 917 (W. Va. 2011)); see
also Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (finding the purpose of the FAA is to “ensur[e] that
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The FAA’s reach is “broad” and coextensive with the “full reach” of the
Commerce Clause.70 Consumer contracts are subject to the same rules as other
agreements.71 While the FAA preempts state law specifically targeting arbitration,
the FAA does not override generally applicable state contract defenses, such as
fraud, duress, or unconscionability.72 Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has
stated repeatedly that a party’s allegation of economic duress can be a viable basis to
challenge an arbitration contract.73 The FAA also does not preempt a neutral statelaw contract formation requirement simply because it can be used to invalidate an
arbitration agreement.74
The Supreme Court’s standard on FAA preemption is quite strict. The Court has
stated that “[a] state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that
a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with [the equal footing]
requirement of [9 U.S.C.] § 2.”75 Another core principle is that “state [law] requiring
greater information or choice in the making of agreements to arbitrate than in other
contracts is preempted.”76 Further, a state statute or legal doctrine may not treat
arbitration as an “inferior means of dispute resolution.”77 For this reason, the
Supreme Court has disapproved “attacks on arbitration [that] ‘res[t] on suspicion of
arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law
to would-be complainants,’ and as such, they are ‘far out of step with our current
strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving
disputes.’”78

private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms”) (quoting Volt Info.
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
70

Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987).

71

THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Patton, 741 F.3d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 2014).

72

L & R Farm P’ship v. Cargill Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 798, 803 (W.D. Tenn. 2013) (citing
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).
73

E.g., Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010).

74

Mitchell v. Am. Fair Credit Ass’n, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 201 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
75

Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.

76

Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (quoting 2 IAN MACNEIL
§ 19.1.1, (1994)).

ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW

77
See THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Patton, 741 F.3d 1162, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 2014)
(citing Supreme Court decisions).
78

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (quoting Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)). For other commentary on
FAA preemption and arbitration, see, for example, William G. Phelps, Annotation, Preemption by Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 et seq.) of state laws prohibiting or
restricting formation or enforcement of arbitration agreements, 108 A.L.R. Fed. 179 (1992);
Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration's Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233 (2011); Hiro N.
Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1189 (2011); Christopher R.
Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393 (2004); David S. Schwartz,
The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of Congress over State Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541
(2004); Kristopher Kleiner, Comment, AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion: The
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B. Radin’s Approach and the FAA
Radin is unabashed in her philosophical opposition to contemporary pre-dispute
arbitration terms in mass-market consumer contracts. Radin repeatedly indicates that
these clauses are a blight on the U.S. economy.79 She also contends that they
degrade U.S. democratic institutions because these arbitral contracts improperly
require consumers to forfeit numerous state-granted rights, such as the right to trial
by jury.80 Further, she objects that modern pre-dispute arbitration terms and
processes that: (1) bypass the consumer's right to collective remedies, such as class
actions and class arbitration; (2) result in decisions rarely subject to appellate review;
(3) involve arbitrators that are usually business persons who are more sympathetic to
merchants than consumers; and (4) are inefficient because they are secret, ad hoc
and, non-precedential.81
Indeed, her antipathy goes so deep that she accuses the Supreme Court in its
interpretation of the FAA of condoning “invidious” racial or sexual discrimination
and of “underwriting democratic degradation” of governmental institutions by
“making redress impossible, in practice if not in theory, for large numbers of
people.”82 Thus, for Radin, the current arbitration system is inconsistent with the
“rule of law”;83 however, Radin gives minimal attention to another rule of law: FAA
preemption. Radin’s implacable opposition reveals her view that pre-dispute
arbitration, as administered under mass-market consumer contracts, is inferior to
litigation and such arbitral provisions should be targeted for “severe” modification or
even elimination.84 Hence, her suggestion would be preempted as failing the “equal
footing” rule.
C. Kim’s Approach and the FAA
Kim’s proposal overlooks FAA preemption as she emphasizes the perceived
“aberrant” features of adhesion contracts versus required arbitration clauses.85
Nevertheless, she includes arbitration clauses in the “aberrant” contract category and
inappropriately singles out these clauses as “one sided,” “onerous,” and “unfair” to
consumers.86 Therefore, her proposal also could not overcome the “equal footing”
rule.

Disappearance of the Presumption Against Preemption in the Context of the FAA, 89 DENV.
U. L. REV. 747 (2012).
79

See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 4, at 15-18.

80

Id. at 183.

81

Id. at 134-35.

82

Id. at 183.

83

Id. at 132-33, 183. Radin repeatedly couples “mass market boiler plate” with the
pejorative word “scheme.” See, e.g., id. at 35, 39, 174.
84

Id. at 183.

85

See Kim, supra note 4, at 1-11.

86

Id. at 271, 282.
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D. Dawson’s Approach and the FAA
Dawson’s theme resembles Radin’s, in that both authors are diametrically
opposed to adhesive pre-dispute arbitration clauses. Although Dawson’s opinion,
when it comes to enforcement of required arbitration clauses, is “the equities so
strongly favor the claimant,”87 the legal rule is the opposite. Courts have observed,
“rather than being viewed as oppressive, arbitration clauses are favored by both state
and federal law as an economical form of dispute resolution which relieves the
congestion of overburdened courts.”88 Despite FAA preemption case law, Dawson
repeatedly focuses on (and wishes to strike down) contracts solely because they have
arbitration as a required remedy.89 Alternatively, Dawson believes that arbitration is
an inferior rights vindication mechanism as compared with litigation;90 this position,
which is equally fatal to his case, also flaunts the FAA.
To prove the last point, a careful review of Dawson’s Comment reflects his
strong disapproval of contemporary arbitration. He suggests, “[g]iven that economic
duress is a court-made concept, courts could also loosen or even suspend the
[traditional] wrongful-act requirement [in arbitration cases].”91 In his Comment,
Dawson makes clear that his concern is to combat what he pejoratively and
repeatedly terms “forced-arbitration”92 (a label mostly used in the literature by
partisan “employee advocates”).93 Employee advocates use the term “forcedarbitration” to distinguish this practice from what they view as voluntarily negotiated
arbitration in the workplace.94
“Forced-arbitration,” as used by Dawson and others, is a loaded term because it
fails to explain why the parties’ manifested assent, in the form of a signed contract,
to pre-dispute arbitration is insufficient to establish a binding agreement. By using
the code word “forced-arbitration” Dawson has fallen into the mistake of substituting
labels for analysis. Professor Macneil addressed a similar issue when he observed:
Using such terms as compulsory or mandatory in such circumstances is, at
best, highly confusing. At worst, it constitutes question-begging: The very
question at stake where such questions arise is whether whatever consent
to arbitrate as has been manifested should or should not be given full
contractual effect. To call the arbitration compulsory or mandatory is to
answer by label, not by attention to the facts and by analysis.95
87

Dawson, supra note 4, at 243.

88

Rust v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 352 F. Supp. 715, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (citing cases).

89

Dawson, supra note 4, at 243-46 (stating ways in which he believes arbitration clauses
violate legal norms).
90

See generally id.

91

Id. at 243.

92

See, e.g., id. at 234, 247.

93

See Andrew J. Gordon & Kimberley C. Weber, Foreword: Forced Arbitration in the
Workplace, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 1 n.1 (2014).
94

Id.

95

2 IAN MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 17.1.2.2 (1994).
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In his heavy criticisms of arbitration as an inferior form of dispute resolution,
Dawson further complains that merchants seek to overwhelm consumers with
confusing and lengthy boilerplate terms so that consumers will accept arbitration
without actual agreement to this process: “[consumers] ‘consent’ to these arbitration
clauses because they don’t know what else to do.”96 Dawson’s criticism on this point
is off-target because he does not address the settled rules of contractual assent. Thus,
if the offeree’s outward actions convey assent to the offeror from an objective
standpoint, there is no requirement that the offeree subjectively assent.97
Commentators have argued that many reasons, such as the lack of awareness, the
lack of perceived alternatives, and the impact of cognitive biases, demonstrate true
subjective assent is frequently missing in contracting.98
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, however, has a different take:
Customers do not in fact ordinarily understand or even read the standard
terms. They trust to the good faith of the party using the form and to the
tacit representation that like terms are being accepted regularly by others
similarly situated. But they understand that they are assenting to the terms
not read or not understood, subject to such limitations as the law may
impose.99
Note further that if the party bringing the claim sues in court and bypasses a
contractual requirement for arbitration, any notion of “forced-arbitration” is
academic if the responding party also does not insist upon arbitration. In this
situation, the moving party creates a right of election in the respondent to require
arbitration, which it can decline.100
In many other respects, Dawson’s suspicion of arbitration as a fair method of
alternative dispute resolution is intense and pervasive. He believes that state courts
must “protect lay claimants” from an “anti-consumer” Supreme Court bent on
96

See Dawson, supra note 4, at 246.

97

See, e.g., Innova Hosp. San Antonio, L.P. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., 995 F.
Supp. 2d 587, 609 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (“Whether a contract has been formed is determined by
the ‘objective standard of what the parties said and how they acted, not by their subjective
state of mind.’”) (arbitration case); Bloomington Partners, LLC v. City of Bloomington, 364
F. Supp. 2d 772, 779 (C.D. Ill. 2005) (“To determine whether the parties intended to be bound
by the alleged contract, a court looks not to the parties’ subjective intent, but rather to
objective evidence of their intent as expressed to each other in their writings.”) (arbitration
case); see also DeLeon v. Verizon Wireless, LLC, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 810, 820-21 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2012) (“Mutual consent necessary to the formation of a contract ‘is determined under an
objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties, i.e., the
reasonable meaning of their words and acts, and not their unexpressed intentions or
understandings.’ Although mutual consent is a question of fact, whether a certain or
undisputed state of facts establishes a contract is a question of law for the court.”) (quoting
Alexander v. Codemasters Grp. Ltd., 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145, 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)).
98 See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE
251-52 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010).
99

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (emphasis
added).
100

See Vireo, P.L.L.C. v. Cates, 953 S.W.2d 489, 491-92 (Tex. App. 1997).
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“colonizing” state contract law.101 Dawson sees a Supreme Court that has (a)
improperly overturned “decades” of its arbitration precedents, (b) usurped state
courts “of their traditional role as the final arbiter of contracts,” and (c) attempted to
“pull the wool over the nation’s eyes” with decisions like Concepcion.102 Dawson,
however, gives little heed to judicial pronouncements that “even generally applicable
state-law rules are preempted if in practice they have a ‘disproportionate impact’ on
arbitration or ‘interfere[ ] with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus create[ ]
a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.’”103
Still other passages from his Comment strengthen Dawson’s view that nonnegotiable boilerplate arbitration harms the commercial system. He posits that such
clauses require consumers to relinquish commodities “necessary to live in the
twenty-first century.”104 Furthermore, these “forced arbitration clauses” have
“stripped lay claimants of basic procedural protections and given big business the
ability to abuse consumers without fear of class-action liability.”105 Dawson accuses
the Supreme Court of a “hypnotic obsession with consent [that] is impossible to
square with the facts on the ground”106 and that masks the Court’s approval of
consumer “coercion.”107 Where an adhesion agreement contains an arbitration
clause, Dawson wants state courts to engage in an “aggressive interrogation of a
contract’s formation.”108 He further shows his preference for litigation over
arbitration when he cites the “troubling reality” that “nearly every action” that
Americans take — “right down to include eating a bowl of Cheerios—could
constitute a waiver of their right to enter court.”109
By generating this barrage of criticisms about the legitimacy of arbitration,
Dawson is sealing his proposal to the doom of FAA preemption. Oddly, Dawson
makes no meaningful attempt to analyze whether his proposal meets the FAA’s
preemption standards. The closest he comes to a defense against FAA preemption is
his claim that his theory “would allow judges to deploy duress doctrine to void all
sorts of contracts—ranging from spousal agreements to mortgages to forced
arbitration clauses.”110 In other words, Dawson uses these afterthoughts to recast his
doctrine implicitly as one of general applicability to avoid the equal footing rule.
101

Dawson, supra note 4, at 233, 235.

102

Id. at 234-235, 246.

103

Mortensen v. Bresnan Commc’ns, LLC, 722 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2013) (alteration
in original) (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011)
(rejecting argument that Montana’s standard for enhanced mutual assent applied to all
contracts). In Concepcion, the Court rejected the argument that California’s version of
unconscionability applied to all contracts. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
104

Dawson, supra note 4, at 244.

105

Id. at 247.

106

Id. at 244.

107

Id. at 238, 244, 247.

108

Id. at 238.

109

Id. at 247.

110

Id. at 244.
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Despite this possibility, Dawson’s duress model cannot escape that it is
specifically designed to reduce the availability of arbitration, which contravenes the
FAA’s “equal footing” doctrine. But for the perceived problems of contractual
arbitration, Dawson would not be proposing a reform of duress doctrine.111 It takes
very little for a state legislature or court to express undue hostility to arbitration to
warrant preemption; even a passing observation could suffice.112 Dawson more than
amply meets this low threshold. Therefore, Dawson cannot overcome that his
proposal adversely targets arbitration because his desired effect is to “cabin”
arbitration agreements and to “limit the scope of FAA preemption.”113 Dawson
misses that the Supreme Court has ruled, “[w]hat States may not do is decide that a
contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not
fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.”114
It cannot be gainsaid that these three proposals do not derive their meaning from
whether arbitration is at issue (in whole or part) or that their authors greatly prefer
litigation over arbitration. Because all three authors’ proposals violate the “equal
footing” rule of the FAA, the FAA would preempt their suggestions for a more
lenient duress defense in arbitration cases.
III. THE RADICAL (AND DESTABILIZING) REVISIONS OF THE
ECONOMIC DURESS DOCTRINE
A. The Authors and Legal Doctrine
As mentioned in the Introduction, I find no fault with these authors merely
because they go beyond existing case law standards in their proposals. It is helpful,
however, to determine just how far the authors depart from the foundational
elements of current economic duress doctrine and to show the impact such variances
have on the viability of their normative suggestions.
While she uses some traditional duress terminology, Radin’s proposal has no link
to case law. One example of this absence is her position that the focus for economic
duress should shift from “expectation” to “exploitation.”115 The law, however,
already takes this perspective into account: “the doctrine of economic duress is a

111 See Mortensen v. Bresnan Commc’ns, LLC, 722 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2013)
(deeming a Montana doctrine of contractual mutual assent preempted because its “primary
purpose” was to render arbitration agreements invalid at a “higher rate” than other contract
terms).
112 “Ordinarily, common-law principles can invalidate an arbitration agreement, but not
when based on a policy hostile to arbitration.” THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Patton, 741
F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th Cir. 2014). The court found sufficient evidence that New Mexico
courts were hostile to arbitration by the passing comment in a New Mexico Court of Appeals
regarding “subjecting the weaker party to arbitration.” Id. at 1168 (quoting Figueroa v. THI of
N.M. at Casa Arena Blanca, LLC, 306 P.3d 480, 491 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012)). The Tenth
Circuit said this brief passage “clearly evince[es] the view that having to arbitrate a claim is
disadvantageous.” Id. at 1169.
113

See Dawson, supra note 4, at 233-35.

114

Allied–Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).

115

RADIN, supra note 4, at 151.
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‘last resort’ to correct exploitation of business exigencies ‘when conventional
alternatives and remedies are unavailing.’”116
Again, without case law support, she states that economic duress is “especially
controversial” and “extremely contentious.”117 She argues, “[c]ourts could try to
explain better what sort of terms [are economically coercive] and in particular what
specific terms can give rise to economic duress.”118 Radin sees the victims of wealth
disparity in the United States as being especially well-positioned to allege economic
duress in their dealings with merchants.119 Therefore, Radin notes, the more
frequently a practice is “normatively” unfair to the consumer that correspondingly
makes out a stronger case for economic duress.120
Kim accurately summarizes the case law elements of the common-law duress
defense but proposes an “expansion” to “recognize the unique way in which
electronic contracts can be used to force terms upon consumers who have no choice
but to accept them.”121 Kim believes that electronic contracts are an “aberrant”
vehicle because companies have exploited consumers “in a coercive manner” with
“aggressive and oppressive terms.”122 She further faults the courts for how they have
applied “doctrinal rules without considering the impact of the electronic form on the
behavior of the parties.”123 However, Kim is careful to point out that her proposal
for situational duress does not cover all forms of electronic contracting.124
Thus, her proposal for reform makes duress “situational” and limited to where
consumers are “uniquely vulnerable because of their interest in the relevant product
or service.”125 Kim’s proposal does not rely on the current case law standards of the
economic duress defense, and Kim acknowledges this fact.126
Dawson says he accepts the common law’s requirement that a claimant to state a
claim for duress must show “oppressive or coercive behavior.”127 Although he
prefers an “expanded version” of duress to “loosen” or “suspend” the “wrongful act”
requirement, he states that his proposal addressing “forced arbitration” satisfies the
requirement for coercion and that his suggestion for expanding duress is “colorable
116

Johnson v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 891 F. Supp. 522, 529 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Rich
& Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 204 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)).
117

RADIN, supra note 4, at 124, 151.

118

Id. at 151.

119

Id. 151-52.

120

Id. at 151-52.

121

Kim, supra note 4, at 278.

122

Id. at 266.

123

Id. at 267.

124

See id. at 279.

125

Id. at 278.

126

Kim, supra note 4, at 278-79 (noting that her “new” and “novel” defense is an
“expansion” of existing doctrine and departs from prevailing principles by deeming the effect
of duress is to make the contract “void” and not “voidable”).
127

Dawson, supra note 4, at 243.
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under existing law.”128 Thus, Dawson believes that his re-engineered duress defense
doctrine fits within existing case law boundaries.
The following sections of this article will collect the sound principles that many
jurisdictions enforce regarding economic duress applicable to arbitration agreements,
but that Radin, Kim and Dawson omit or give short shrift. As will be seen, the
authors’ suggestions are not maintainable as legitimate extensions of existing law
because they are radical and destabilizing revisions of the common-law economic
duress doctrine.
B. The Policy of the Economic Duress Defense
The duress defense has changed significantly from its early common law origins,
where the defense was limited to actual imprisonment or physical harm to the
offeree.129 Referring to "the modern doctrine of economic duress," commentators
aptly have said the "doctrine is constantly being extended and expanded and bears
slight resemblance to common-law duress."130 Today, most jurisdictions recognize
economic duress (also called “business compulsion”) as a defense to contract
enforcement or to support a cause of action for contract rescission.131
Parties who enter into an agreement under duress have two remedies. They may
either seek rescission of the agreement or they may affirm the agreement and sue for
damages.132 Parties seeking to rescind the contract must be ready, willing, and able
to return the consideration.133 Parties electing to affirm the contract and sue for
damages are not required to return, or offer to return, the consideration they
received.134
Regarding the economic duress doctrine in contract cases, the Supreme Court
observed “the word duress implies feebleness on one side, overpowering strength on
the other.”135 The duress defense helps ensure that the offeree’s manifestation of
assent reflects bona fide agreement of the bargain to the offeror.136 The term
“manifested assent,” in the sense of external acts and conduct, is used advisedly
128

Id. at 242-43.

129 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 9.2 (6th ed. 2009). For a
comprehensive recital of the changing nature of duress, see Ford v. Engleman, 86 S.E. 852
(Va. 1915).
130 28 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
71:1 (4th ed. 2003).
131 See Finstad v. Ransom-Sargent Water Users, Inc., 849 N.W.2d 165, 169 (N.D. 2014)
(citing 28 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
71:7 (4th ed. 2003)).
132

Mutual Savs. Life Ins. Co. v. Osborne, 15 So.2d 713, 718 (Ala. 1943).

133

Ledbetter v. Frosty Morn Meats, 150 So.2d 365, 371 (Ala. 1963).

134

Coastal Concrete Co. v. Patterson, 503 So.2d 824, 830 (Ala. 1987); see also Solomon v.
FloWarr Mgmt., 777 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
135

United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 300 (1942).

136

1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.16 (3d ed. 2004); see also
Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83,
120 (1996).
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because “no testimony can show with certainty what the actual mental condition of
the party was [at the time].”137 Duress also has an element that the actor act in
defense of his property interests.138
Accordingly, the policy for economic duress is:
“[T]o discourage or prevent an individual in a stronger position, usually
economic, from abusing that power . . . in a bargain situation.” Thus, the
fundamental issue in duress cases is whether the statement which induced
the agreement is the type of offer to deal that the law should discourage as
oppressive and thus improper.139
The three authors’ suggestions do not warrant a fundamental change in duress
legal doctrine. To an extent, they misapprehend the nature of doctrinal change under
the common law. While there is no doubt that “[t]he common law has an inherent
capacity for growth and change,”140 courts “particularly loath to indulge in the
abrupt abandonment of settled principles and distinctions that have been carefully
developed over the years.”141 “The persistent movement of the common law toward
satisfying the needs of the times is soundly marked by gradualness.”142 Where a
perceived need exists for “fundamental changes” in the law, they must be brought
about sparingly and with deliberation,143 because “[p]redictability is an important
component of our common law system.”144 Another concern is that while Dawson
correctly states that the “precise elements of an economic duress claim vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction”145 another truism is that the wording varies less than the
substance and most jurisdictions follow very similar foundational principles
regarding the economic duress defense.146 The authors’ proposals undermine these
values through a radical restructuring of common law economic duress.
137

Wilkerson v. Bishop, 47 Tenn. 24, 28 (1869).

138 See Schlossberg v. E.L. Trendel & Assocs., 380 N.E.2d 950, 953 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)
(explaining that compulsion, or duress, occurs “[w]here a person, to prevent injury to himself,
his business or property, is compelled to make payment of money which the party demanding
has no right to receive and no adequate opportunity is afforded the payor to effectively resist
such demand”).
139 Richards v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 62 P.3d 320, 327 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (alteration in
original and citations omitted) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Sanchez, 815 P.2d 613, 616 (N.M.
1991)).
140

15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law § 2 (2014).

141

State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 445-46 (R.I. 2008) (quoting John T.
Loughran, Some Reflections on the Role of Judicial Precedent, 22 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 8
(1953)).
142

Falcone v. Middlesex Cty. Med. Soc’y, 170 A.2d 791, 799 (N.J. 1961).

143

Aranson v. Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1027 (N.H. 1995).

144

Hill v. Mayall, 886 P.2d 1188, 1191 (Wyo. 1994).

145

Dawson, supra note 4, at 243.

146

See LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:19 (“There have been numerous
formulations of the elements necessary to invoke the defense of economic duress or business
compulsion, though all of them share certain basic characteristics.”).
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C. Defining “Force,” “Coercion,” and “Oppression”
Dawson, Radin, and Kim each indicate that a merchant who merely furnishes the
consumer a contract that contains a forced arbitration clause meets the element of
force, coercion, or oppression.147 Simply proposing a contract, however, is not what
the law means by the “force,” “coercion,” or “oppression” needed to show economic
duress. Instead, a complex body of law explains the circumstances evidencing the
vendor’s use of force, coercion, or oppression to obtain a contract. These factors far
exceed the depth of the explanations in the three commentaries.
Duress is an improper persuasion technique that operates extrinsically to the
contract terms. As the Georgia Court of Appeals has observed, “[d]uress must come
from without, and not from within. It must be exerted by the other person or his
agent, and can not be a creation of the mind of the person claiming his will has been
restrained by fear.”148 Accordingly, the party proposing a contract must further
commit “wrongful pressure”; that is, acts or threats, to induce the purported victim to
accept the terms, such as by “extortive measures,” “compulsion,” or “improper or
unjustified demands.”149
The existence of economic pressure upon the offeree and even a threat of
considerable financial loss absent contract acceptance are not necessarily “duress”
for purposes of rendering a contract unenforceable.150 The same is true for the
offeree’s fear of economic hardship or financial devastation.151 A good example of
economic duress is where A threatens B, his former employee, that A will try to
prevent B's employment elsewhere unless B agrees to release a claim that he has
against A, and B, having no reasonable alternative to the threat, is thereby induced to
make the contract.152
When such economic stress occurs, it “must be attributable to the party against
whom the duress is alleged.”153 The test for duress is based on “improper external
pressure or influence”154 that operates on the “condition of the mind of the person

147 See Dawson, supra note 4, at 242 (explaining that duress results merely from the vendor
“proposing” an improper take it or leave it deal); RADIN, supra note 4, at 150-52 (indicating
that the mere existence of such a contract is inherently coercive); Kim, supra note 4, at 283
(“The introduction of an electronic contract . . . creates an improper threat in the sense that the
company forces the consumer to accept or risk forfeiture of valuable goods or services.”).
148

Mabou v. Eller, 502 S.E.2d 760, 763 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting King v. Lewis, 4
S.E.2d 464, 468 (Ga. 1939)).
149

See, e.g., Haston v. Crowson, 808 So. 2d 17, 22 (Ala. 2001).

150

Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 334, 347 (2011).

151

Cochran v. Ernst & Young, 758 F. Supp. 1548, 1556 (E.D. Mich. 1991).

152

See RESTATEMENT, supra note 99, at § 176 illus. 11; see also Massi v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio, 765 F. Supp. 904, 909-10 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (finding a claim for
economic duress where an employee, after learning his position was eliminated, was told to
sign a waiver agreement or he would not receive severance benefits).
153

Chouinard v. Chouinard, 568 F.2d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1978).

154

Gilley v. Gilley, 778 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
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claiming the intimidation.”155 Economic duress must be based on conduct of the
opposite party and not merely on the necessities of the purported victim.156
The wrongfulness of the pressure or threat is a matter of degree and exists on a
continuum. The gravity or magnitude of the threat in relation to the contract at issue,
along with the resulting degree of unfairness, is a significant consideration. Thus,
“[p]ressure may be considered wrongful when ‘it is so oppressive under given
circumstances as to constrain one to do what his free will would refuse.’”157
Economic duress also occurs where the offeror has exacted a “disproportionate
exchange of values” (i.e., unfair consideration) between the parties.158 On the other
hand, where the complaining party is challenging a contract term “that he could have
been expected to agree to even if not under duress, the inference of duress is
weakened, along with the further inference that duress caused whatever harm the
victim is seeking to redress.”159
A contract can be valid on its face even where the result of the bargain came
from oppressive conduct of the offeror.160 “[T]here is nothing per se unconscionable
about arbitration agreements.”161 Although “there is no line of absolute
demarcation” between a threat that deprives a party of its free will as opposed to a
threat that portends some lesser degree of harm, any “finding of duress at least must
reflect a conviction that one party to a transaction has been so improperly imposed
upon by the other that a court should intervene.”162
Overlooking the above principles and constraints, the authors draw unworkable
lines between legitimate bargaining techniques in a free-market society and the
offeror’s intolerable coercion of offerees. A severe danger exists that the authors’
proposed expansions of the duress defense would apply where the plaintiff signed
155 Windham v. Alexander, Weston & Poehner, P.C., 887 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tex. App.
1994).
156

See, e.g., Int’l Paper Co. v. Whildren, 469 So.2d 560, 563 (Ala. 1985) (“It is said that
economic duress must be based on conduct of the opposite party and not merely on the
necessities of the purported victim.”); see also McCord v. Goode, 308 S.W.3d 409, 413 (Tex.
App. 2010) (“Duress must be shown from the acts or conduct of the party accused of duress,
not the emotions of the purported victim.”).
157 Shanley & Fisher, P.C. v. Sisselman, 521 A.2d 872, 879 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1987) (quoting Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 120 A.2d 11, 15 (N.J. 1956)); see also Wurtz v.
Fleischman, 293 N.W.2d 155, 160 (Wis. 1980).
158 Gainey v. Gainey, 675 S.E.2d 792, 799 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009); see also RESTATEMENT,
supra note 97, at § 176 cmt. a (“The fairness of the resulting exchange is often a critical factor
in cases involving [such] threats.”); LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:43 (“Where
there is adequacy of consideration, there is generally no duress.”).
159 Prof’l Serv. Network, Inc. v. Am. All. Holding Co., 238 F.3d 897, 902 (7th Cir. 2001)
(Posner, J.); see also In re Cheryl E., 207 Cal. Rptr. 728, 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that
a contract cannot be rescinded based on duress when evidence shows the offeree would have
entered the contract notwithstanding the duress).
160 Cummings, Inc. v. Dorgan, 320 S.W.3d 316, 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (“[A] contract,
although valid on its face, may not be enforceable if it can be proved that the contracting party
acted under duress.”).
161

EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias, 934 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex. 1996).

162

Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 372 F.2d 753, 758 (2d Cir. 1967).
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the contract “merely because he or she entered into it with reluctance, the contract
was very disadvantageous to him or her, the bargaining power of the parties was
unequal, or there was some unfairness in the negotiations preceding the
agreement.”163 These circumstances, as well as an offeree’s mere “acquiescence” to
the offeror, are insufficient.164 Another key limitation missing from the authors’
proposals is that a party may assert the affirmative defense of economic duress “only
when the party against whom it is claimed was responsible for the claimant's
financial distress.”165
Again, the mere existence of the merchant’s superior bargaining position over the
buyer is not automatic proof that the merchant further exerted wrongful pressure on
the claimant.166 Briefly stated, the essence of duress is an improper threat that
induces a “reasonably prudent person”167 to enter a contract against the latter’s
better “judgment” and “desire.”168 All the above policies are needed to safeguard
arbitration contracts given their central role in a properly functioning commerciallaw system.
D. Economic Duress and Causation
The three proposals do not address the element that the duress was the “sole and
efficient cause” of the person’s entering the contract;169 if the person had an
independent reason for accepting the deal duress is absent.170 “If the payment or
exchange is made with the hope of obtaining gain, there is not duress; it must be
solely for the purpose of protecting the victim's business or property interests.”171
163

17A C.J.S. Contracts § 230 (2015).

164

See Coop. Res. Ctr., Inc. v. Se. Rural Cmty. Assistance Project, Inc., 569 S.E.2d 545,
547 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); see also Dunes Hosp., LLC v. Country Kitchen Int’l, Inc., 623
N.W.2d 484, 489-91 (S.D. 2001).
165

Deer Creek Ltd. v. N. Am. Mortg. Co., 792 S.W.2d 198, 203 (Tex. App. 1990); accord
Cheshire Oil Co., v. Springfield Realty Corp., 385 A.2d 835, 839 (N.H. 1978); see also Ariel
Preferred Retail Grp., LLC v. CW Capital Asset Mgmt., 883 F. Supp. 2d 797, 820 (E.D. Mo.
2012) (stating that a party's knowledge of the other party's financial pressures is irrelevant to
the question of duress, because the financial necessity of a party, not caused by the other
contracting party, does not constitute duress).
166

See Evans v. FedEx Express, No. W2013–01717–COA–R3–CV, 2014 WL 309351, at
*4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2014).
167

Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1292 (N.D. Okla. 2004).

168

Delaney v. Chief of Police of Wareham, 539 N.E.2d 65, 70 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).

169

Conagra Trade Grp., Inc. v. Fuel Expl., LLC, 636 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1173 (D. Colo.
2009) (quoting Hastain v. Greenbaum, 470 P.2d 741, 747 (Kan. 1970)). “It is obvious that if
some factor other than the wrongful act of which plaintiffs complain motivated them to enter
into the . . . agreement, there was no duress.” Hous., Inc. v. Weaver, 246 S.E.2d 219, 225
(N.C. Ct. App. 1978); cf. Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 123 A.2d 67, 70-71 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1956) (“[I]f it can be shown that the action sought to be avoided would not have taken
place had it not been for the alleged coercive acts by the defendant, the transaction will be
deemed to have been procured by duress, notwithstanding that it may be shown that there
were other contributory, efficient causes of action sought to be avoided.”).
170

See S+L+H S.p.A. v. Miller-St. Nazianz, Inc., 988 F.2d 1518, 1528 (7th Cir. 1993).

171

Id. (quoting Pope v. Ziegler, 377 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985)).
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Therefore, if the buyer wants to purchase the commodity, and has reservations about
whether a contract term (such as required arbitration) is too onerous, duress will be
absent when the buyer accepts the deal and his desire for the item overcomes his
objection to the unfavorable term(s).
Because the three proposals insufficiently acknowledge the element that the
offeror—besides inviting the offeree’s contract acceptance—must have applied
unlawful or improper pressure through “coercion” to “induce” the other party to
enter the contract,172 their proposed reforms greatly dilute and even omit the driving
element of the defense. There is no justification for a lesser standard in arbitration
cases.
E. Free Agency/State of Mind of the Victim
The authors’ formulations inadequately cover the case-law standard that the
actor’s threat or coercion has “practically destroy[ed] the free agency of a party”173
or “induce[d] a fearful state of mind in the other party, which makes it impossible for
[the party] to exercise his own free will.”174 This form of coercion induces the
victim to sign a contract that he otherwise would not have accepted.175 Thus, the
presence of economic duress means the absence of the victim’s “volition.”176
As a practical matter, the victim of undue duress necessarily alleges that “the
agreement was not signed voluntarily.”177 The bar is high because the law
distinguishes lack of volition and the party’s difficult economic choices: “[T]he fact
that a party faces a difficult choice—[such as] between additional benefits or
pursuing his legal rights—does not alone indicate lack of free will.”178 To the same
effect, the offeree’s mere annoyance, vexation, personal embarrassment, or the
pressure of the circumstances does not deprive the party of his free will.179
172 See Int’l Paper Co. v. Whilden, 469 So. 2d 560, 563 (Ala. 1985) (“Unless unlawful or
unconscionable pressure is applied by the other party to induce the entering into a contract,
there is not economic compulsion amounting to duress.”); see also Crossroads Ford Truck
Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., 792 N.E.2d 488, 494 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“‘Coercion’ and
‘duress’ have essentially the same meaning: overpowering another's free will by imposition,
oppression, or undue influence.”).
173 Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469, 474 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005); accord T.G. v. Dep’t of
Children & Families, 9 So.3d 48, 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
174 Noble v. White, 783 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (quoting Zebedeo v.
Martin E. Segal Co., 582 F. Supp. 1394, 1417 (D. Conn. 1984)); see also Premier Farm
Credit, PCA v. W-Cattle, LLC, 155 P.3d 504, 521 (Colo. App. 2006) (It must “clearly appear
that the force or threats employed actually subjugated the mind and will of the person against
whom they were directed . . . .”) (quoting Wiesen v. Short, 604 P.2d 1191, 1192 (Colo.
1979)).
175 See Norton v. Mich. State Highway Dep’t, 24 N.W.2d 132, 135 (Mich. 1946); see also
LORD &WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:20.
176

See Cox & Floyd Grading, Inc. v. Kajima Const. Servs., 589 S.E.2d 789, 791 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2003).
177

In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348, 351 (N.H. 2003).

178

See EEOC v. Am. Express Publ’g Corp., 681 F. Supp. 216, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

179

See Herget Nat’l Bank of Pekin v. Theede, 537 N.E.2d 1109, 1112 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
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These last judicial principles suggest that the threat qualifies for duress only
when it leaves the person with the absence of contracting capacity.180 “The ultimate
fact in issue,” in a duress claim, “is whether the victim was bereft of the free exercise
of his will power.”181 In effect, the duress overpowers the victim’s “will and
inclination”182 and substitutes the wrongdoer’s will for the other party’s desires.183
Kim and Dawson briefly mention the case law stating that duress is lacking when
the consumer was not deprived of his free will when agreeing to arbitrate. However,
it is clear these authors see no requirement for the destruction of the buyer’s “free
agency” or “free will.”184 Radin does not mention the free will issue either way in
her discussion of economic duress, but it is also plain that Radin sees no such
requirement for a destruction of that capability.185 The three authors further
overlook the possible injustice to the merchant when, despite the buyer’s later
allegation of the merchant’s threats and coercive pressure, all the merchant can
observe either in-person or through electronic communication, is a willing purchaser
that signs the contract without complaint. These unambiguous external
manifestations of assent are the essence of contract making186 and are equally
applicable to arbitration contracts.187 As a result, the authors’ proposals undermine
the principle that “the courts do not want to punish an innocent party who entered
into the contract without any reason to suspect that the other party was subject to
improper coercion.”188

180 See id. at 1111 (stating that economic duress operates on the theory that party is deemed
to have lacked mental capacity requisite to making of contract).
181 Aurora Bank v. Hamlin, 609 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (emphasis added);
see also Alexander v. Standard Oil Co., 423 N.E.2d 578, 582 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“To
establish duress, one must demonstrate that the threat has left the individual ‘bereft of the
quality of mind essential to the making of a contract.’”) (quoting Kaplan v. Kaplan, 182
N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ill. 1962)); Yurek v. Shaffer, 678 S.E.2d 738, 746 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)
(providing a good discussion of the factors indicating when the victim’s will has been
overcome); Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposal for the Contract Duress Doctrine, 107 W.
VA. L. REV. 443, 470 nn.154-56 (2005) (extensive citations). But see RESTATEMENT, supra
note 99, at § 175 cmt. b (criticizing the free will element because it is “vague and
impracticable”).
182

See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ramsey, 612 F. Supp. 326, 328 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).

183

See People ex rel. Carpentier v. Daniel Hamm Drayage Co., 161 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ill.
1959) (“Acts performed by a person under duress or compulsion are not to be attributed to his
will. They are, in the eyes of the law, the result of another's will, for which the actor should
not be held responsible.”).
184

See Dawson, supra note 4, at 244; Kim, supra note 4, at 283-86.

185

See RADIN, supra note 4, at 150-52.

186

See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text; cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 99, at § 19
cmt. c (“[E]ven though the intentional conduct of a party creates an appearance of assent on
his part, he is not responsible for that appearance unless he knows or has reason to know that
his conduct may cause the other party to understand that he assents.”) (emphasis added).
187

See, e.g., Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2012).

188

LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:8.
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F. Duress: A Doctrine of Last Resort and a Policy to
Safeguard Freedom of Contract
The three authors’ expansion of duress runs counter to settled policy that
economic duress is a “sparingly” invoked and “narrowly restricted” doctrine.189
According to case law, it applies “only to special, unusual, or extraordinary
situations in which [the actor] uses unjustified coercion . . . to induce a contract [with
the victim.]”190 An overly liberal economic duress defense would make signed
contracts of “little value” and thereby leave contracting relationships “in a confused
and chaotic state.”191 Consistent with the legal doctrines noted above, case law
indicates that courts are narrowly construing the economic duress defense.192 Put
more succinctly, “the doctrine of economic duress is considered a doctrine of ‘last
resort’"193—but that is not the Radin, Kim, or Dawson approach.
The authors also fail to explore the ramifications of their hollowed-out duress
defense for the overall commercial-law system. Although bona fide duress claims
“occur very infrequently” in the legal world,194 the three proposals would
substantially increase allegations of this duress defense. These proposals would
incentivize the entire consumer population to seek contract rescission where
consumers are strongly dissatisfied (actual or feigned) with “forced” arbitration.
Dawson, Radin, and Kim apparently have no difficulty in potentially destabilizing
every cable television contract, cell phone contract, insurance contract, and many
other mass-market consumer contracts195 merely because the consumer strongly
189 See In re Am. Int’l Grp., Consol. Derivative Litig., 976 A.2d 872, 885 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(“Given that the doctrine of duress is usually asserted when a person knowingly violates a
legal duty, courts rightly employ duress sparingly”); see also Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v.
Natarelli, 401 N.Y.S.2d 404, 409 (N.Y. Sup. 1977) (naming duress a “narrowly restricted
defense”). Radin erroneously states that courts have narrowly construed duress “in the past.”
RADIN, supra note 4, at 275 n.2.
190 E.g., Newburn v. Dobbs Mobile Bay, Inc., 657 So. 2d 849, 852 (Ala. 1995); Dunes
Hosp., LLC, v. Country Kitchen Int’l, 623 N.W.2d, 484, 489 (S.D. 2001); see also In re
Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 519 B.R. 47, 58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[Under New York
law], successful claims of economic duress are reserved for ‘extreme and extraordinary
cases.’”) (quoting VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 2001)).
191

Nixon v. Leitman, 224 N.Y.S.2d 448, 467-68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).

192

See Giesel, supra note 181, at 463. Professor Giesel explains that in published state
cases from 1996 through 2003, duress was discussed in eighty-eight cases, but in only nine of
those cases did the court resolve the matter in favor of the duress claim. Id. Similarly, from
1995 to 2003, only two federal appellate cases resulted in findings in favor of duress. Id. at
464. Radin asserts that courts apply the economic duress defense “unpredictably.” RADIN,
supra note 4, at 124. The statistics from the Giesel article, however, show that courts,
predictably, reject the claim.
193

LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:19.

194

See King v. Donnkenny, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738 (W.D. Va. 2000) (applying
Virginia law).
195 See Dawson, supra note 4, at 246 (citing these contract types). Dawson considers these
items necessities, and protected by the economic duress doctrine, but most courts state
otherwise. See infra notes 242-249 and accompanying text. Because Kim’s proposal is more
limited to instances of situational duress regarding aberrant electronic contracts, such as

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016

25

62

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:37

believes an arbitration clause is oppressive. It must be remembered that “[r]escission
is a harsh remedy, typically disfavored by the courts.”196
Moreover, for Radin, Kim, and Dawson it appears that the party’s mere
subjective dissatisfaction with pre-dispute arbitration would suffice to raise the
defense, but the courts generally include both subjective and objective components
to prevail on the defense. The subjective element is the party's personal reaction to
circumstances, while objective elements are the reasonableness of the fear and
unjustness of the injury based on how reasonable persons would react to the
circumstances.197
The three commentators also are seemingly unconcerned with the adverse impact
of readily available rescission upon the legitimate interests of the vendors of goods
and services, many of which are small businesses living on tight profit margins. The
authors’ willingness to give numerous purchasers an easy exit strategy from their
contracts and to leave a class of merchants potentially unable to cover their costs can
only harm, not enhance, the economy.198
A related reason why a properly calibrated economic duress defense is necessary
for the commercial system is that courts must give breathing room to freedom of
contract.199 “Freedom of contract” means parties have the right to bind themselves
legally; it is a judicial concept that contracts are based on mutual agreement and free
choice.200 Courts and commentators have observed,
Freedom of contract is a “paramount public policy” that takes individual
autonomy ‘seriously as a principle for ordering human affairs.’ It is the
“content hostage” situations, her proposal does not extend as far as Dawson’s or Radin’s. See
Kim, supra note 4, at 282-85.
196

JDI Holdings, LLC v. Jet Mgmt., 732 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1231 (N.D. Fla. 2010).

197

Averette v. Indus. Concepts, Inc., 673 So.2d 642, 644 (La. Ct. App. 1996); see also
Oskey Gasoline & Oil Co., v. Cont’l Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1281, 1286 (8th Cir. 1976); Dunes
Hosp., LLC v. Country Kitchen Int’l, 623 N.W.2d 484, 490 (S.D. 2001). Some jurisdictions
go further: “A duress defense is evaluated according to an objective standard.” Mathias v.
Jacobs, 167 F. Supp. 2d 606, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also Allen v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty.
Coll. Dist. No. 508, 675 N.E.2d 187, 190 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Dockery v. Estate of Massey,
958 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that “economic duress” is so coercive and
severe that person of ordinary firmness could not resist it). Still other jurisdictions make the
test subjective. See Shanley & Fisher, P.C. v. Sisselman, 521 A.2d 872, 878 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1987) (“[T]he test for duress is subjective, rather than objective, and does not turn
on whether the duress is of ‘such severity as to overcome the will of a person of ordinary
firmness.’”) (quoting S.P. Dunham & Co. v. Kudra, 131 A.2d 306, 309 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1957)). For additional discussion of the “subjective/objective” test, see LORD &
WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:20.
198 The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized the value of ensuring fairness to businesses
facing increased liability. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752
(2011) (approving an arbitration clause that bared class action relief because otherwise
defendants could face a “devastating loss” with the undue risk that “defendants will be
pressured into settling questionable claims”).
199

See Giesel, supra note 181, at 465-68 (noting role of freedom of contract in limiting the
validity of the economic duress defense).
200

Freedom of Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 779 (10th ed. 2014).
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‘founding principle’ of the American economy, a ‘cherished’ value of the
legal system, and a ‘vital part’ of contractual obligation. Perhaps even
more importantly, it is a fundamental individual right, consistent with law
and public policy, protected by the federal and many state constitutions,
as well as by federal and state civil rights legislation and the [Uniform
Commercial Code].201
As one commentator points out, “[t]he reluctance with which courts find duress
at all and the reluctance of courts to adopt an approach involving review of the
substantive fairness of the deal suggests that courts of today are highly influenced by
the notion of freedom of contract.” 202
Numerous courts point to the need for freedom of contract by both buyer and
seller because this concept promotes “the necessary certainty, stability and integrity
of contractual rights and obligations.”203 An adequate duress doctrine thereby aids
the autonomy of the individual parties and their ability to enjoy liberty of
contract.204 Another aspect of the relation of economic duress and the freedom of
contract is that “[c]ourts are reluctant to set aside agreements or to interfere with the
freedom of contract because of the desirability of finality in private dispute
resolutions.”205 As a result, the economic duress defense is limited whereby
“ordinary hard bargaining is not only acceptable, but indeed, desirable, in our
economic system, and should not be discouraged by the courts.”206 Absent any

201 Steven W. Feldman, Autonomy and Accountability in the Law of Contracts: A Response
to Professor Shiffrin, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 177, 220-22 (2009) (citing authorities).
202

Giesel, supra note 181, at 487 (emphasis added).

203 E.g., ARC LifeMed, Inc. v. AMC-Tenn., Inc., 183 S.W.3d 1, 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)
(quoting McCall v. Carlson, 172 P.2d 171, 187-88 (Nev. 1946)); Rich & Whillock, Inc. v.
Ashton Dev., Inc., 204 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“[Economic duress combat]
exchanges make a mockery of freedom of contract and undermine the proper functioning of
our economic system.”); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 99, at ch. 7 introductory note
(“Contract law has traditionally relied in large part on the premise that the parties should be
able to make legally enforceable agreements on their own terms, freely arrived at by the
process of bargaining.”).
204 See Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., 340 P.3d 27, 33 (Or. 2014) (“The right to contract
privately is part of the liberty of citizenship, and an important office of the courts is to enforce
contractual rights and obligations.”); see also Moyers v. City of Memphis, 186 S.W. 105, 109
(Tenn. 1916) (“[I]f there is one thing which more than another public policy requires, it is that
[persons] of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting,
and that their contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred, and
shall be enforced by courts of justice.”) (cited approvingly in In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807
(Tenn. 2014)); Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 171, 202 (2013) (“Duress doctrine should honor parties' autonomy and decisions but
at the same time acknowledge their constraints.”).
205

Centric Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 731 P.2d 411, 414 (Okla. 1986). In this regard,
duress can be deemed a challenge to party autonomy because it allows a court to override the
parties’ manifestation of assent based on the extrinsic misconduct of the offeror. See CHARLES
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 74 (1981).
206

LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:7.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016

27

64

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:37

“legally cognizable restraint,” both parties remain “free to drive whatever bargain
the market will bear.”207
The question arises regarding the connection between freedom of contract,
economic duress, and arbitral agreements. Freedom of contract has a long history
with the Supreme Court208 and includes the Court’s emphasis on freedom of
contract as the underlying policy of the FAA.209 As one author observes, the Court
sees “[n]o contradiction or tension whatsoever between both efficient and resolutionfacilitative procedures, on the one hand, and freedom of contract, on the other.”210
Instead, “the Court [has] embraced freedom of contract . . . both as a descriptive
matter and as a normative one.”211 Thus, the Court’s FAA jurisprudence reflects the
belief that “freedom of contract [is] essential for arbitration to realize its promise as
an efficient dispute resolution procedure because of the parties’ need for procedural
‘adaptability.’”212 A commentator concludes, “the FAA now stands for pure
procedural freedom of contract.”213 Accordingly, freedom of contract is an
important link between the economic duress defense and arbitration.
Indeed, numerous state and federal court decisions expressly connect “freedom
of contract” with the arbitral process. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has
commented, “[i]t follows that a state law which limits freedom of contract with
respect to arbitration agreements covered by the FAA conflicts with the FAA and is
preempted by it.”214 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has opined, “freedom of
contract [ensures] that parties are not required to submit to arbitration any dispute

207

Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 863 N.E.2d 503, 512 (Mass. 2007).

208 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co. of Balt., 130 U.S. 396, 408 (1889) (“[W]hile it is
justly urged that those rules which say that a given contract is against public policy, [they]
should not be arbitrarily extended so as to interfere with the freedom of contract . . . .”).
209 See 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 15:11 (4th ed. 2010) (“This freedom of contract ideal, resulting in substantial party
autonomy concerning arbitration, was reiterated forcefully in the final arbitration decision of
the Court's 1995 term, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan [514 U.S. 938 (1995)].”); 7
PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O'CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW
§ 21:43 (2014) (“The [Supreme Court’s] ‘freedom to contract’ message [in arbitration cases]
is both inviting and forcefully stated.”) (analyzing Volt Info Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 472 (1989)).
210 J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Public Law, 124 YALE L.J.
3052, 3063 (2015).
211

Id.

212 Id. at 3064 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc, 473 U.S.
614, 633 (1985)).
213 Id. at 3074 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1743 (2011));
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013)). Thus, the Court in Italian
Colors emphasized that courts “rigorously enforce” the parties’ agreement as written. Italian
Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2306. While no Supreme Court case was found expressly using the
phrase “freedom of contract” or “liberty of contract” in its arbitration case law, the Court uses
the rhetoric judges typically employ to support the freedom of contract. See id.; see also
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1743.
214

Fahnestock & Co., v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 520 (2d Cir. 1991).
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which [they have] not agreed so to submit.”215 In another example, a U.S. District
Court in Utah, citing Utah law, commented that “[w]e respect the parties' freedom to
contract by enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms and ensuring
that arbitration proceedings are conducted in the manner to which the parties have
agreed.”216 Many more examples exist exemplifying this judicial perspective and the
decisions all vigorously support freedom of contract in matters of arbitration.217
The judicial philosophy to support good faith and even hard bargaining in arbitral
agreements is an important element of free market principles. Where a party in the
American capitalist system through talent or diligence obtains market superiority
over competitors or customers, the mere fact that the party in the arbitral setting has
“intentionally gained market power with the purpose and intent of exercising
leverage against its customers” does not show the merchant’s conduct “went beyond
hard bargaining.”218 As stated by the Second Circuit,
Because an element of economic duress is thus present when many
contracts are formed or releases given, the ability of a party to disown his
obligations under a contract or release on that basis is reserved for
extreme and extraordinary cases. Otherwise, the stronger party to a
contract or release would routinely be at risk of having its rights under the
contract or release challenged long after the instrument became
effective.219
Insofar as the weaker party in many, if not in almost all, contract negotiations
could potentially claim duress because of the parties’ disparity in power, and thereby
readily disown his obligations and disrupt the economy, courts will strictly construe
the defense against the party asserting it.220 Consistent with this rule, the party
seeking to void a contract because of economic duress “shoulders a heavy

215

Chelsea Family Pharmacy v. Medco Health Sols., 567 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2009).

216

Roberts v. Cent. Refrigerated Serv., 27 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1259 (D. Utah 2014).

217 E.g., Kitsap Cty. Deputy Sheriff's Guild v. Kitsap County, 219 P.3d 675, 678 (Wash.
2009) (“Reviewing an arbitration decision for mistakes of law or fact would call into question
the finality of arbitration decisions and undermine alternative dispute resolution. Further, a
more extensive review of arbitration decisions would weaken the value of bargained for,
binding arbitration and could damage the freedom of contract.”); Miller v. Miller, 707 N.W.2d
341, 345 (Mich. 2005) (noting that the parties decide the scope of arbitration, and a court may
not “infringe[ ] on the parties' recognized freedom to contract for binding arbitration.”); L & R
Realty v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 715 A.2d 748, 753 (Conn. 1998) (“Arbitration agreements
illustrate the strong public policy favoring freedom of contract and the efficient resolution of
disputes.”); Feinberg v. Boros, 951 N.Y.S.2d 110, 120 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (“[F]reedom of
contract dictates that parties to an arbitration should be free to contract to the scope of that
arbitration, including the reach of the arbitral decision.”).
218

Cf. Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 863 N.E.2d 503, 512, 514 n.6 (Mass. 2007); see also
Dunes Hosp., LLC v. Country Kitchen Int’l, 623 N.W.2d 484, 490 (S.D. 2001) (“All
negotiations inherently involve a certain amount of pressure and coercion.”).
219

VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis
added).
220

See id. at 124; see also Cabot Corp., 863 N.E.2d at 512.
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burden”221 to prove his case by “clear and convincing evidence.”222 No reason
exists to construe arbitration contracts under a different standard. Another doctrine
counseling a narrow interpretation of the duress defense in arbitration cases is the
rule that courts in construing arbitral contracts “should apply ordinary state-law
principles that govern the formation of contracts.”223 Radin’s, Kim’s, and Dawson’s
proposals inadequately acknowledge these public policies.224 Because the proposed
suggestions to expand the duress defense beyond exceptional circumstances violate
the usual state-law principles the proposals deprive arbitration agreements of the
“equal footing” guarantee.225
G. The Duress Defense: Is the Contract Void or Voidable?
Dawson and Radin apparently accept settled doctrine that “even where a party is
subject to duress, the resulting contract is voidable, not void.”226 The difference
between a “void” and “voidable” contract is that with the former, no contract ever
came into being and is incapable of enforcement, but with the latter, the victim has
the choice of denying the existence of the agreement or of affirming the contract and
being bound by the terms.227
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts observes,
The distinction between a “void contract” and a voidable contract has
important consequences. For example, a victim of duress may be held to
221

Davis & Assocs. v. Health Mgmt. Servs., 168 F. Supp. 2d 109, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

222

Giesel, supra note 181, at 468 n.147 (2005) (citing decisions).

223

First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); see also Comer v.
Micor, Inc., 436 F.3d 1098, 1104 n.11 (9th Cir. 2006).
224 Radin subscribes to the freedom of contract as a “core value” but argues extensively that
the current system of adhesion contracting has eradicated this freedom because she sees a
system of involuntary divestment of consumer rights. See RADIN, supra note 4, at 3, 19, 56.
Kim briefly mentions that the economic duress defense protects the freedom of contract but
does not explain why her proposed dilution of the duress defense is consistent with this core
value. Kim, supra note 4, at 278. Dawson makes no mention of the freedom of contract.
Freedom of contract, however, can co-exist with adhesion contracts. See Bailey v. Lincoln
Gen. Ins., 255 P. 3d 1039, 1047 (Colo. 2011) (insurance policies); see also Forecast Homes,
Inc. v. Steadfast Ins., 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
225

Dawson states that the decisions are generally “hostile” to claims of economic duress
and praises those “few” cases that are “receptive” to the defense. Dawson, supra note 4, at
244. In point of fact, the cases that Dawson criticizes as failing to understand “the realities on
the ground” analyze at length—and correctly apply—the legal standards for economic duress.
See id. at 244 n.64 (citing decisions). As for the three cases that Dawson cites as being
“receptive,” Dawson acknowledges that the Texas case was reversed on appeal. See In re RLS
Legal Sol., LLC, 156 S.W.3d 160 (Tex. App. 2005), rev’d, 221 S.W.3d 629, 632 (Tex. 2007).
In the Alabama case cited, the court “made no findings of fact” and therefore it was
impossible to tell if economic duress was present at all. Ex parte Early, 806 So. 2d 1198, 1202
(Ala. 2001). The only valid citation he provides is a Massachusetts case, ITT Commercial Fin.
Corp. v. Tyler, No. 917660, 1994 WL 879497, at *5-7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 1994),
which addresses a common pattern of economic duress.
226
227

See Mandavia v. Columbia Univ., 912 F. Supp.2d 119, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 99, at § 7.
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have ratified the contract if it is voidable, but not if it is “void.”
Furthermore, a good faith purchaser may acquire good title to property if
he takes it from one who obtained voidable title by duress but not if he
takes it from one who obtained “void title” by duress.228
This decision is at the election of the victim, who might decide that
notwithstanding the offeror’s coercion, the victim desires the freedom of contract to
ratify the transaction.229 Thus, courts have said, “[a] party may ratify a contract or
release entered into under duress by ‘intentionally accepting benefits under the
contract.’”230 Indeed, courts have gone so far as to say that “[a] party who fails to
promptly challenge an agreement on the ground of duress waives the defense.”231
Sound reasons exist why a contract induced by economic duress is voidable and
not void. “[J]ust as in the case of fraud, mistake, undue influence, and other
invalidating causes, there is an actual and intended expression of assent by the victim
to the transaction in question, [even] though [how] . . . the assent was obtained
make[s] it inequitable to [mandate] the enforcement of the resulting bargain.”232
Therefore, based on the external acts of the parties, which is the basis for the
contract, the requisites for a binding agreement are present if the offeree chooses to
accept the deal and withdraw his earlier manifested non-concurrence.233 On the
other hand, if the victim of duress changes his mind and wishes to obtain the benefit
of the contract imposed by the other party, a rule disallowing this choice would rob
the offeree of his freedom of contract to ratify the agreement.
The above discussion is also in line with the rule that when a serious question
exists about the validity of a contract, the agreement should be voidable instead of
void whenever possible. In a related area, courts have said, “[i]n circumstances
where public policy imposes limitations on the freedom of contract, [courts] are
228 Id. at § 174 cmt. B, cmt. d; see also LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:8
(stating the general rule that a contract procured through duress is “voidable” and not “void”).
The authorities do provide that an act of physical duress could render an arbitration agreement
void, but such allegations are extremely rare. See Farnsworth v. Towboat Nantucket Sound,
Inc., 790 F.3d 90, 97 (1st Cir. 2015).
229

See Anselmo v. Mfrs. Life Ins., 771 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1985); see also DiMartino
v. City of Hartford, 636 F. Supp. 1241, 1252 (D. Conn. 1986); Willms Trucking Co., v. JW
Constr. Co., 442 S.E.2d 197, 202 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994).
230 VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting In re
Boston Shipyard Corp., 886 F.2d 451, 455 (1st Cir. 1989)).
231

Acquaire v. Canada Dry Bottling, 906 F. Supp. 819, 828 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); see also New
Orleans Flooring Supply, Inc. v. Kentile Floors, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 8158, 1994 WL 97505, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1994) (“A contract signed under duress is not void but voidable, and a
party must move quickly or the defense is deemed waived and the contract ratified”); Port
Chester Elec. Constr. Corp. v. Hastings Terraces, Inc., 284 A.D. 966, 967 (N.Y. App. Div.
1954).
232

LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:8.

233

3 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
7:37 (4th ed. 1992) (“The only justification for enforcement of the modified undertaking . . .
seems to be the apparent voluntariness of the promisor in freely uttering [his] new promise . . .
.”).
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well-advised to wield a scalpel rather than a sledgehammer.”234 Emphasizing
freedom of contract policies, an Illinois court observed,
The courts are reluctant to restrict the freedom of citizens to make their
own agreements. Declaring a contract void and unenforceable is a power
the courts therefore exercise sparingly. An agreement will not be held
void, as being contrary to public policy, unless it is “clearly contrary to
what the constitution, the statutes or the decisions of the courts have
declared to be the public policy or unless [it is] manifestly injurious to the
public welfare.”235
All the above principles have equal resonance in the arbitral setting. Because
arbitration agreements occupy such a central role in the American economy, they
deserve “equal footing” on this issue.
Kim travels an unusual path on this “void/voidable” point. In her proposal, she
states that “[u]nlike traditional duress, a finding of situational duress would render a
contract void and not merely voidable.”236 She indicates that consumers are
“uniquely vulnerable” because of their great interest in the relevant product or
service.237 Therefore, the “contract” should be void because of the strong possibility
that a consumer could be entrapped into contractual liability based on external
conduct evidencing implied ratification.238 This argument, however, is not
persuasive. The better view is to leave the choice to the individual under the freedom
of contract to seek out the proper advice and to affirm or disaffirm the original
coercive transaction. Where the law allows the parties to make the transaction
voidable, this choice holds out the possibility that parties can repair their bargain and
lessens the potential for economic disruption, which is a policy objective equally
pertinent to arbitration agreements.
H. Duress and the “Necessaries of Modern Life”
Radin is content to leave unexplained her statement that recipients could
experience a form of duress “when presented with take it or leave it boilerplate in
acquiring a necessity of life.”239 Kim does not address whether her proposal covers
the victim’s necessaries. Under Dawson’s proposal, the coercion element is met
when the actor’s proposal would cause the second party to “forego something that a
reasonable person would deem necessary for modern life.” 240 Unfortunately,

234

Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 384 (Tenn. 2011).

235 In re M.M.D., 820 N.E.2d 392, 399 (Ill. 2004) (quoting H&M Commercial Driver
Leasing, Inc. v. Fox Valley Containers, Inc., 805 N.E.2d 1177, 1180 (Ill. 2004)).
236

Kim, supra note 4, at 266, 278.

237

Id.

238

Id. at 278.

239

RADIN, supra note 4, at 275 n.2.

240

Dawson, supra note 4, at 242. In a later passage, Dawson restates the proposed coercion
element as what would would cause the victim to “forego some commodity that is necessary
to live in the twenty-first century.” Id. at 244. The two versions differ in that the second test
omits the requirement for a “reasonable” person’s deprivation and that it transforms the
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Dawson does not explain the criteria for how a particular commodity would meet
this standard. Does the phrase “necessary for modern life” refer to the usual legal
definition of “necessaries?” Also, does he mean to include some or all of the
following commodities that he appears to link to his standard, which include
“internet service providers,” “public utility,” “hospital” services, “airline” service,
“cellular phone” service, “brokerage for a retirement account,” “nursing home,”
“cable television,” and “credit cards”?241 Most importantly, how does Dawson’s
proposal categorize arbitration agreements—do all or most of them come within the
definition of “necessaries?”
Numerous problems exist with this element of Radin’s and Dawson’s proposed
test. First, one accepted meaning of “necessaries” is “things that are indispensable to
living,” which include “whatever food, medicine, clothing, shelter and personal
services usually considered reasonably essential for the preservation of life.”242 If
Radin’s and Dawson’s intent is to rely on the accepted meaning of “necessaries,”
then cellular phone service,243 cable television service,244 and personal
computers245 are outside the definition. Similarly, brokerage for retirement accounts
and breakfast cereals should also be excluded because they are not “necessary for
modern life.”
A second, more liberal definition of “necessaries” also exists. This standard
covers whatever is reasonably needed for subsistence, health, comfort and education,
considering the person’s age, station in life and medical condition.246 Excluded from
this definition is anything purely ornamental, anything solely for pleasure, anything
the person already has been furnished, anything that concerns his estate or business
beyond personal needs, and borrowed money.247 This second standard goes beyond
the first one by considering the person’s personal attributes. If this standard is
Radin’s and Dawson’s intent, do they propose that courts conduct a searching
inquiry into to the victim’s personal needs and station in life so that the very well-off
could be entitled to more protection than the average person? In this regard, case law
provides that a “necessary” item for a multi-millionaire’s lavish lifestyle could

concept “modern life” into the “twenty-first century.” This Article assumes that Dawson
meant to incorporate a “reasonable person’s” perspective for both versions.
241

Id. at 242-47.

242

Necessaries, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1192 (10th ed. 2014).

243 See Halprin v. Verizon Wireless Serv., No. 07-4015, 2008 WL 961239, at *7 (D.N.J.
Apr. 8, 2008); see also Stiener v. Apple Comput., Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1027 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (finding iPhone is not a necessity); Riensche v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. C061325Z, 2007 WL 3407137, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 2007); Dreyfus v. Ameritech Mobile
Commc’ns., 700 N.E.2d 162, 167 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Butcher v. Ameritech Corp., 727
N.W.2d 546, 554 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006).
244

See Smith v. Prime Cable of Chi., 658 N.E.2d 1325, 1333 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).

245

See Provencher v. Dell, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1202 (C.D. Cal. 2006).

246

See Necessaries, supra note 242, at 1192; see also Walter v. Palisades Collection, LLC,
Civil Action No. 06–378, 2011 WL 1666869, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 2011) (noting that this
standard is broader than the bare essentials needed “to hold body and soul together”).
247

See Necessaries, supra note 242, at 1192; see also Walter, 2011 WL 1666869, at *4.
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include a chauffeured limousine, a private chef, a mink coat, and even whale meat
and caviar.248
If the second standard is the intent, the intrusion into the individual’s lifestyle
and the potential for defendants to harass plaintiffs about their life choices is plain.
In any event, courts should construe “necessaries” “as closely as possible” (just like
economic duress itself) so as to preclude opening the door to a broad class of
contracts for items that are merely useful and to avoid destroying the “necessaries”
classification altogether.249 By leaving the concept “deemed necessary” so openended, Radin and Dawson provide inadequate guidance to the bench and bar on
covered versus uncovered commodities, a problem equally pertinent to arbitration
agreements.
I. Effect of the Offeror’s Good Faith, Legally Permissible Negotiating Position
Courts accept that a wrongful threat for purposes of economic duress is lacking if
the actor has a “good faith belief” that his negotiating position is a “plausible one”
under the circumstances.250 The merchant’s mere use of non-negotiable arbitral
boilerplate is morally blameless because courts properly reason that “the very
ubiquity of the practice precludes a conclusion that the use of a nonnegotiable
contract, on its own, is in any way unethical.”251 Similarly, most courts say “it is not
duress to threaten to take action which is legally permissible.”252 These principles
stem from the concept that “[a]n intentional wrongful act is an essential element of a
claim for duress.”253 Radin gives little attention to this doctrinal point about the
economic duress defense. While Kim mentions the wrongful act requirement of
duress at length in her article,254 she does not connect it with arbitration contracts.
248 See Necessaries, supra note 242, at 1192; see, e.g., Gimbel Bros. v. Pinto, 145 A.2d 865
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1958) (mink coat); Bloomingdale Bros. v. Benjamin, 112 N.Y.S. 2d 33 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1951) (whale meat and caviar).
249 See 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 9:19 (4th ed. 2009).
250 See, e.g., Happ v. Corning, Inc., 466 F.3d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 2006); Zebedeo v. Martin E.
Segal Co., 582 F. Supp. 1394, 1417 (D. Conn. 1984) (“[W]here one party insists upon a
contractual provision, which it honestly believes itself entitled to, unless such belief is patently
unreasonable, conduct cannot be wrongful, and thus, cannot constitute duress.”); River Bank
Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that duress will be
absent merely because one party in good faith mistakenly takes a different view of contract
rights from the other party).
251

Vasquez v. Greene Motors, Inc., 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 778, 787 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).

252

Kamerman v. Steinberg, 891 F.2d 424, 432 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Hammelburger v.
Foursome Inn Corp., 431 N.E.2d 278, 285 n.4 (N.Y. 1981)); see also Redmon v. McDaniel,
540 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Ky. 1976) (“[I]t is not duress to threaten to do what one has a legal
right to do, nor is it duress to threaten to take any measure authorized by law and the
circumstances of the case.”); cf. City of Scottsbluff v. Waste Connections of Neb., Inc., 809
N.W.2d 725, 744 (Neb. 2011) (“Lawful coercion becomes impermissible when employed to
support a bad-faith demand: one that the party asserting it knows (or should know) to be
unjustified.”).
253 Free Spirit Aviation, Inc. v. Rutherford Airport Auth., 664 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. Ct. App.
2008).
254

Kim, supra note 4, at 276-78, 281-82.
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The proceeding discussion focuses on the Dawson proposal, which comes closest of
the three commentaries to addressing this connection.
One of Dawson’s main concerns about arbitration agreements is to protect
employees from perceived employer overreaching.255 Contrary to Dawson’s
assertions, the near-unanimous weight of authority says it is not economic duress
where an employer refuses to grant or continue a person’s employment unless the
employee agrees to waive his statutory right to litigate an employment dispute in
court.256 As a New Jersey court remarked, “courts that have considered this issue
have consistently determined that the economic coercion of obtaining or keeping a
job, without more, is insufficient to overcome an agreement to arbitrate statutory
claims.”257 Along the same lines, commentators have confirmed that “[d]uress
claims also fail because employers have the legal right to mandate arbitration as a
condition of employment, and employees have the free will to refuse employment or
quit if they do not wish to be bound.”258
Furthermore, Dawson is incorrect that the employee will be the victim of duress
where the employer imposes the choice of continuing employment or “waiv[ing] her
right to litigate employment disputes before a court or an administrative agency.”259
As courts have commented, “[a] prospective, voluntary agreement to proceed to
arbitration with a [statutory right of action] does not amount to an employee
‘foregoing,’ or waiving, statutory rights.”260 Rather, “by agreeing to arbitrate, a
party ‘trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.’”261 Even more misleading is
Dawson’s argument that the employer commits a wrongful act in compelling a
prospective employee to choose between employment and waiver of the ability to
litigate a possible dispute in court.262 Courts have said, “[i]f [the applicant]
disagreed with anything contained in the application she was free to simply look
elsewhere for employment. . . . When a party . . . voluntarily agrees to something in
255

See Dawson, supra note, 4, at 243 (commenting extensively).

256

Id. (citing this circumstance as constituting duress). See generally Jay M. Zitter,
Annotation, What Constitutes Duress by Employer or Former Employer Vitiating Employee's
Release of Employer from Claims Arising out of Employment, 79 A.L.R. 6th 377 (2012).
257

See Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 749 A.2d 405, 412 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2000) (citing cases).
258 Stephen A. Plass, Mandatory Arbitration as an Employer’s Contractual Prerogative:
The Efficiency Challenge to Equal Employment Opportunity, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 195, 220
(2011); see Cooper v. MRM Inv., 367 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the district court
erred in refusing to compel arbitration where an employee was required to sign arbitration
agreement as a condition of employment); see also Hathaway v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d
227, 229 (Tex. 1986) (“[W]hen the employer notifies an employee of changes in employment
terms, the employee must accept the new terms or quit.”).
259

Dawson, supra note 4, at 243.

260 EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 500, 503 (E.D. Mich. 1997),
rev’d on other grounds, 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1998).
261

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626–28 (1985)).
262

See Dawson, supra note 4, at 244-45.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016

35

72

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:37

an attempt to obtain employment they are not being ‘forced’ to do anything.”263
Therefore, Dawson’s argument that the waiver of a statutory right is equal to an
agreement to arbitrate is unconvincing.
Dawson has overlooked his best counter-argument in addressing the employee
discharge scenario. In a widely cited illustration, the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts indicates that the threat of employee discharge can constitute duress where
A makes a threat to discharge B, his employee, unless B releases a claim
that he has against A. The employment agreement is terminable at the will
of either party, so that the discharge would not be a breach by A. B,
having no reasonable alternative, releases the claim. A's threat is a breach
of his duty of good faith and fair dealing, and the release is voidable by
B.264
According to the case law, however, this illustration applies only where a
contract exists between A and B, and does not apply when there is employment at
will.265 The majority rule is that employment at will unaccompanied by a bilateral
contract does not include the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.266
Because the vast majority of American workers operate under employment at
will,267 the Restatement illustration would provide only limited assistance to
Dawson’s argument. Another obstacle to an employee’s successful invocation of
economic duress is that “people want to eat first and consider legal and philosophical
implications later. The average worker in need of a job is unlikely at the outset to
balk at an arbitration clause.”268 It bears emphasis, however, that duress should be
absent even with employment at will because all workers inherently face such
pressure with any decision to leave or stay at his job if a worker is dissatisfied with
his employer.
Dawson next argues it will be economic duress where a merchant refuses to
provide the consumer an “essential service” unless the consumer agrees to arbitrate
263 Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, 966 F. Supp. at 504 (emphasis in original); accord Cooper,
367 F.3d at 504.
264

RESTATEMENT, supra note 99, at § 176 cmt. e, illus. 11.

265 See, e.g., DeJean v. United Airlines, Inc., 839 P.2d 1153, 1160 (Colo. 1992) (noting the
Restatement illustration concerns a threat to breach a contract).
266

See Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Dwiggins, 596 A.2d 1069, 1077 (Md. 1991) (“To the extent
that we are asked to impose a general requirement of good faith and fair dealing in at-will
employment situations, we decline the invitation. ‘[A] small number of courts have implied a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing into employment contracts . . . . The majority of courts
confronting the issue, however, have refused on both policy and analytical grounds to imply
any version of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing into [at will] employment
contracts.’”) (quoting Peter Stone Partee, Note, Reversing the Presumption of Employment at
Will, 44 VAND. L. REV. 689, 699 (1991)); see also Green v. Medco Health Sols. of Tex., LLC,
947 F. Supp. 2d 712, 732 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (“The general rule provides that a duty of good
faith and fair dealing cannot arise from an at-will employment relationship.”).
267
E.g., Marian K. Riedy & Kim Sperduto, At-Will Fiduciaries? The Anomalies of a “Duty
of Loyalty” in the Twenty-First Century, 93 NEB. L. REV. 267, 268 (2014).
268 Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1387
(1991).
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all disputes arising from a non-negotiable contract.269 To the contrary, a provider of
essential or necessary services can properly employ an adhesion contract that
mandates the consumer accept arbitration. A couple prime examples are pre-dispute
arbitration agreements for nursing home270 or doctor-patient271 services. Indeed, it
would violate the FAA for a state to fence off essential or necessary consumer
services from the FAA. As stated by the Supreme Court, “when state law prohibits
outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward:
The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.”272 On the other hand, a particular
contract for necessary services can result from duress under the particular
circumstances.273
The above employee discharge scenario shows the linkage between the
bargaining between two economic actors and freedom of contract. Most instances,
such as where the employer gives the employee the choice of discharge or accepting
an arbitration agreement, or where a merchant asks the consumer to decide between
forgoing a purchase or accepting arbitration as part of the sale, concern valid free
market activity. Generally, these circumstances are the antithesis of duress because
they merely ask the offeree to select between “perfectly legitimate alternatives.”274
“Furthermore, a seller’s refusal to perform unless a buyer signs an arbitration
agreement is not economic duress against the latter, at least where the buyer will not
suffer a forfeiture by refusing to sign, since the seller has the legal right to refuse to
sell under that circumstance.”275
Finally, Dawson argues that there is a line of cases that “[states] a company’s
status as the sole supplier of a particular product may subject the company to
economic duress claims in certain circumstances.”276 Dawson misreads these cases.
269

See Dawson, supra note 4, at 243.

270

Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203-04 (2012).

271

Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tenn. 1996).

272

Brown, at 1203-1204 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740,
1747 (2011)); see also Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 318 (finding that doctor-patient arbitration
agreement in an adhesion contract not automatically unenforceable under the Tennessee
Uniform Arbitration Act).
273 Cf. Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Lumpkin, 23 So. 3d 1092, 1098
(Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (recognizing this possibility).
274

LORD &WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:14.

Simply because the alleged victim is faced with a variety of options, none of which is
especially good and, indeed, all of which are bad, does not give rise to duress; as long
as there are some reasonable, though unpalatable, alternatives, the alleged victim has a
choice, and duress will not be found.
Id. at §71:40.
275

6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 30 (2015). The seller’s right to refuse to sell is subject to the
antitrust laws, though. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (“In
absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman Act] does not restrict
the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business,
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal . . . .”);
see also Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
276

Dawson, supra note 4, at 245-47.
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Instead, they stand for the accepted doctrine that “a threatened breach constitutes
duress where the failure to receive the promised performance will result in
irreparable injury to the business.”277 To illustrate this point, economic duress will
be absent where party A (without otherwise being oppressive or abusive) threatens
party B that A will exercise rights that are legally available to A.278 No reason exists
why the rules cited above should differ with an arbitration agreement.
J. Availability of an Alternative Remedy
Radin’s proposal to expand the duress defense does not satisfactorily accept the
consistently applied rule that if the purported victim has the alternative of “an
adequate legal remedy,” economic duress is absent.279 The same critique applies to
Kim’s proposal280 and Dawson’s proposal281 for economic duress dilution.
Case law indicates that the claimant must show that he had no feasible alternative
legal remedy as an element of the action or defense of economic duress.282 The
prevailing rule is that,
[i]n making the determination whether a plaintiff who asserts a duress
claim had a reasonable alternative available, the courts employ an
objective test that considers all of the circumstances surrounding the
277 LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:41. Compare Thomas Constr. Co. of Mo. v.
Kelso Marine, Inc., 639 F.2d 216, 220 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981) (a general contractor in executing a
purchase order was under economic duress in that the only alternative source of concrete
would be for it to set up its own batch plant and such would be economically prohibitive),
with In re Nat’l Steel Corp., 316 B.R. 287, 310 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) (finding that a sole
supplier’s mere refusal to deal with a customer because the customer will not accept the
supplier’s terms is not economic duress).
278

See, e.g., Choksi v. Shah, 8 So. 3d 288, 293-94 (Ala. 2008) (“It is never duress to do
that which a party has a legal right to do.”) (quoting Neuberger v. Preferred Accident Ins.
Co., 89 So. 90, 92 (Ala. Ct. App. 1921)). But see Richards v. Allianz Life Ins. of N. Am., 62
P.3d 320, 329 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) ([W]hile a threat by a party not to perform a contractual
duty is not by itself improper, it may be found improper if combined with a threat which is
extortionate, results in a forfeiture, or is made for purposes unrelated to the contract, such as
inducing the recipient to make a separate contract.”).
279 See RADIN, supra note 4, at 151-52. Compare Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 863 N.E.2d
503, 514 (Mass. 2007) (“[C]ourts have consistently held that the presence of an adequate legal
remedy undermines claims of economic duress.”) (quoting Ismert & Assocs., Inc. v. New
England Mut. Life Ins., 801 F.2d 536, 549 (1st Cir. 1986) (Breyer, J., concurring)), with
Nelson v. Stanley Blacker, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 107, 109 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (“In order to prevail
on a claim of economic duress, plaintiff must show, inter alia, that he had available no legal
remedies to avoid the duress.”).
280

See Kim, supra note 4, at 277, 281-84, 286.

281 See Dawson, supra note 4, at 242-43 (mentioning the “no reasonable alternative” test
but failing to provide any details on its scope).
282

See, e.g., Totem Marine & Tug Barge, Inc. v. Alaska Pipeline Serv., 584 P.2d 15, 22
(Alaska 1978) (“Thus, in order to avoid a contract, a party must also show that he had no
reasonable alternative to agreeing to the other party's terms, or, as it is often stated, that he had
no adequate remedy if the threat were to be carried out.”); see also John Dalzell, Duress by
Economic Pressure (pt. 2), 20 N.C. L. REV. 341, 369-73, 378-82 (1942) (citing Radich v.
Hutchins, 95 U.S. 210, 213 (1877)).
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particular transaction. Thus, whether a contract should be voidable
because of duress depends on whether the plaintiff, in addition to either
doing what the defendant demanded or not doing it, had a reasonable third
option, and if so, whether a reasonably prudent person would have taken
that available option.283
For any goods or services, where a party seeks contractual rescission because of
economic duress, such a plaintiff has the reasonable alternative that it can
immediately go to court and seek preliminary injunctive relief followed by a
declaratory judgment on the merits.284 Although resorting to the courts might not be
an adequate alternative where the purported victim’s immediate business or property
interests are at stake, the fact remains that plaintiffs can and do invoke these
alternative remedies in many contexts with little, if any, prejudicial delay.
This doctrine is further related to the principle that time pressure is frequently a
necessary element of the coercion. Case law says, “[d]uress will not prevail to
invalidate a contract entered into with full knowledge of all the facts, with ample
time and opportunity for investigation, consideration, consultation, and
reflection.”285 Similarly, duress will be absent where the plaintiff had the
opportunity to consult with counsel before entering into the allegedly coercive
contract.286 The burden is on the complaining party to show it lacked this
opportunity.287 Even if one accepts the dubious argument that arbitration agreements
are inherently coercive, nothing about arbitration agreements indicates that they
should operate under different legal standards.
Should the increasing prevalence of electronic contracting and similar
innovations result in a different legal test for arbitration agreements? Kim argues that
a consumer encountering a rolling contract lacks a sufficient legal alternative to
reject the terms and to return the product.288 With a “rolling contract,” such as for
computer software, where the box containing these goods has additional terms, these
post-purchase terms can be binding after the purchaser has reviewed them after the
purchase.289 The contract is “rolling” because the effect of the transaction is to delay
283

LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:14.

284 See Cabot Corp., 863 N.E.2d at 511; Gibbs v. SLM Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.
Mass. 2004) (“[A]bsent compelling circumstances, the availability of a reasonable alternative,
such as a legal or administrative remedy, will defeat a claim of economic duress.”).
285 In re Nat’l Steel Corp., 316 B.R. 287, 310 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) (emphasis added)
(quoting Clement v. Buckley Mercantile Co., 137 N.W. 657, 661 (Mich. 1912)); see also
Hopkins v. NewDay Fin., LLC, Civ. No. 07-3679, 2008 WL 2654635, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June
30, 2008) (finding that employees informed that their employer would terminate their
employment if they failed to sign an agreement to accept arbitration were under severe time
pressures when they signed the agreement).
286 See Carlile v. Snap-on Tools, 648 N.E.2d 317, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); see also
Degenhardt v. Dillon Co., 669 A.2d 946, 950-51 (Pa. 1996).
287 See Nelson v. Stanley Blacker, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 107, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“In order
to prevail on a claim of economic duress, plaintiff must show, inter alia, that he had available
no legal remedies to avoid the duress.”).
288

Kim, supra note 4, at 283-84.

289

Id. at 279.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016

39

76

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:37

the contract formation until the buyer has reviewed the terms and decided whether
they are acceptable.290 Where the buyer timely objects and rejects the goods, he can
return them and obtain a refund.291 Moreover, “a person who voluntarily declines to
take with him a box containing important materials relating to the product he
purchased must be treated as though he had received the box (and the materials in
it).”292 Absent a purchaser’s timely objection and return of the goods, the terms
become binding regardless of his subjective assent (or non-assent) to those terms.293
As can be seen from the above summary, while there is certainly complexity and
new ways of applying common-law concepts of offer and acceptance to a rolling
contract, there is no hint of threats, force, coercion, or similar forms of oppression
against the consumer in the usual circumstances. “While new commerce on the
Internet [and elsewhere] has exposed courts to many new situations, it has not
fundamentally changed the principles of contract.”294 Because economic duress
cannot be based on mere “acquiescence,”295 Kim is incorrect when she argues that
“[t]he company is forcing the consumer into the contract and the consumer
acquiesces in order to avoid forfeiture of a vested interest.”296 Therefore, the
standard concepts of economic duress are applicable to arbitral agreements and no
persuasive legal reason exists to accept the proposition that rolling contracts are
automatically reflective of improper economic coercion.
K. Ratification of Economic Duress
Ratification issues commonly arise with contentions that the putative victim has
ratified (i.e., condoned) the original coercive agreement. The essential elements of
ratification are the removal of duress and the alleged victim’s intent to ratify297
where at the time of the act the victim had full knowledge of the facts and the
capability of acting freely.298 The victim’s ratification of a contract initially induced
through duress can occur in three different ways: (1) intentionally accepting
contractual benefits; (2) acquiescing in the contract for a substantial time after
receiving the opportunity to avoid it; or (3) acting upon the contract such as by
performing under it or acknowledging it.299 Radin and Dawson leave out whether
they accept the standard “ratification doctrine” and its consequences. Kim implicitly
290

Id.

291

Id.

292 Norcia v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC, No. 14–CV–00582–JD, 2014 WL 4652332,
at *16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2014).
293

Id.; see also John E. Murray, Jr., The Dubious Status of the Rolling Contract Formation
Theory, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 35, 37-38 (2012) (explaining “rolling contracts”; extensive analysis
of cases).
294

Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Register.com,
Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004)) (analyzing rolling contracts).
295

See Dunes Hosp., LLC v. Country Kitchen Int’l, 623 N.W.2d 484, 491 (S.D. 2001).

296

Kim, supra note 4, at 285.

297

United States v. McBride, 571 F. Supp. 596, 613 (S.D. Tex. 1983).

298

Hous., Inc. v. Weaver, 246 S.E.2d 219, 228 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978).

299

Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 863 N.E.2d 503, 515 (Mass. 2007).
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rejects this doctrine because she states that under her theory the contract would be
void and not voidable.300 Kim is correct that only “[a] contract that is voidable for
duress may be ratified and affirmed.”301
The economic duress defense seeks to remedy injustice and not to create it.302
Keeping this principle in mind, what this ratification doctrine requires is for the
claimant to “complain promptly of the coercive acts that allegedly forced it into the
contract” or else risk a finding that he has lost the ability to disclaim the contract.303
In this way, the offeree disaffirming the contract “shortly” after its execution does
his part to help ensure the stability and reliability of contracts and to dispel the
doubts that could have surrounded the validity of the contract.304 Further, the
purported victim disaffirming the voidable contract must restore, “if possible,” the
benefit to the offeror.305 Arbitration contracts require the same protection to
preserve the freedom of contract and the predictability of commercial transactions.
A possibility exists that Radin and Dawson would join Kim in rejecting the view
that consumers could be held to ratify an otherwise onerous arbitration agreement.
As with other writers,306 Radin argues that boilerplate contracts shrink legal rights to
the “vanishing point” and are only “purported contracts.”307 Dawson argues that “a
boilerplate agreement containing an arbitration clause is simply not a contract under
state law” when there is an absence of true bargaining.308 Notably, all three
commentators cite no direct case law authority for these bold propositions.

300

See Kim, supra note 4, at 278.

301

Id.; see also Cabot, 863 N.E.2d at 515; LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:8
(stating general rule that contract procured through duress is “voidable” and not “void”).
302

Nixon v. Leitman, 224 N.Y.S.2d 448, 468 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).

303

Cabot, 863 N.E.2d at 516.

304

Id. at 515; see also VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir.
2001) (discussing extensively this policy).
305 See, e.g., Consumer Health Info. Corp. v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 1001,
1007 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (“[A] party claiming economic duress can effect a rescission only by
promptly notifying the other party of an intent to rescind the agreement and restoring the
consideration received.”); Solomon v. FloWarr Mgmt., Inc., 777 S.W.2d 701, 705-06 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1989) (stating that persons seeking to rescind the contract must return or be ready,
willing, and able to return the consideration); Blanchard Press v. Aerosphere, Inc., 51
N.Y.S.2d 715, 720 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) (“One coerced into signing an agreement may
rescind, but, to do so, must return the thing or benefit received thereunder.”); see also
FARNSWORTH, supra note 136, at § 4:19.
306

See, e.g., W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 541 (1971) (“But if one does pay attention to
whether the supposedly necessary consents have been obtained in situations such as these, the
conclusion is immediate that the standard form is not a contract.”).
307

RADIN, supra note 4, at 3, 8, 10-12, 20, 22, 30, 158, 213.

308

Dawson, supra note 4, at 239. Dawson further states, “The significant issue is whether
the ‘contracty thing’ containing the arbitration clause can even be classified as a contract,” and
“if the agreement cannot be negotiated or altered in any way--then a court could hold that no
valid contract was ever formed.” Id. at 238.
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While Radin,309 Kim,310 and Dawson311 each rely on a 1970 law review article
advocating that an adhesion agreement is more of a product than a contract,312 it is
clear that this idea is so far outside the mainstream that no court has found this
conception persuasive.313 Radin and Dawson also do not cite the established
definition of a “contract” (“[A]n agreement, obligation, or legal tie whereby a party
binds itself, or becomes bound, expressly or impliedly, to pay a sum of money or to
perform or omit to do some certain act or thing”)314 or explain why it does not apply
to adhesion contracts.315 Indeed, “contracts of adhesion are well accepted in the law
and routinely enforced.”316 Numerous cases hold that adhesion contracts meet the
test for valid offer and acceptance.317 Further, as another commentator observes,
“[w]hile some writers have suggested that standard form contracts are not contracts
at all but rather products that accompany goods and services, courts are reluctant to
adopt that view, at least explicitly.”318
Accordingly, it is ironic that Radin, Kim, and Dawson each maintain that
adhesion contracts with oppressive arbitration agreements are not contracts, but that
it is also necessary for the law to expand the economic duress defense to relieve
consumers of liability under these compelled instruments. What each author
overlooks is on the one hand, if the document does not represent a contract and the
agreement is void, then economic duress is not necessary to avoid liability because

309

See RADIN, supra note 4, at 100.

310

See Kim, supra note 4, at 267.

311

See Dawson, supra note 4, at 238.

312

Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 143 (1970).

313

Only two cases even mentioned this forty-five year old article and neither case relied on
Professor Leff’s theory as the ratio decidendi. See Brokers Title Co., v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins., 610 F.2d 1174, 1179-81 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that a contract bargained between parties
of relatively equal strength was not an adhesion contract); Spychalski v. MFA Life Ins., 620
S.W.2d 388, 393-96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (“A policy of insurance as a contract of adhesion
will be given effect according to the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured or
beneficiary as to the terms.”). Dawson and Radin also fail to mention that Leff undercut his
own analogy regarding consumer contracts. See Leff, supra note 312, at 157 (“A consumer
contract is not a thing, at least not the way cars, cows and couches are things. . . .”). In fact,
Leff candidly observed, “[T]he economics of the mass distribution of goods make [never
enforcing adhesion contracts] a commercially absurd answer.” Id. at 144.
314

Kosmicki v. State, 652 N.W.2d 883, 893 (Neb. 2002).

315

To her credit, Radin acknowledges that the law does consider boilerplate to be a valid
method of contract formation even as she disagrees with this conclusion. See RADIN, supra
note 4, at 12, 30.
316

Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).

317 E.g., Energy Home v. Peay, 406 S.W.3d 828, 834, 836 (Ky. 2013) (stating that adhesion
agreement is consistent with valid “offer and acceptance.”); Pietroske, Inc. v. Globalcom, Inc.,
685 N.W.2d 884, 888 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (“Nothing in the contract prevented a true meeting
of the minds.”).
318 Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV.
1307, 1314 (2005).
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with a void contract there are no liabilities.319 On the other hand, if the authors are
saying that a lenient standard of economic duress is needed, then these commentators
are accepting the possibility there can be a contract resulting from such
circumstances. A transaction cannot be both a contract and a non-contract at the
same time.
The common-law ratification doctrine treats both parties fairly, facilitates
arbitration, and enhances the commercial law system. It is best to leave it to the
individual under the freedom of contract to seek out the proper advice and to affirm
or disaffirm the original coercive transaction to meet the consumer’s best interests.
At the same time, under the above-cited requirement that the victim make restitution
to the other party “if possible,” fairness requires that the individual claimant make
restitution to the merchant in the interests of justice. One would predict that many, if
not most, private parties would be unwilling to sacrifice the benefits of the contract
that could later be seen as the product of economic duress simply because of the
inclusion of an arbitration remedy.
L. Conversion of Adhesion Contracts into Instruments of Duress
The practical effect of the three authors’ reformulated duress doctrines is that
they have converted all adhesion contracts with pre-dispute arbitration clauses into
instruments of duress. Their definition of an improperly coercive contract—that it is
a take-it-or-leave-it deal requiring consent to a non-negotiable contract or forgoing
certain benefits—is actually the definition of a contract of adhesion.320 In point of
fact, however, case law states that an adhesion contract does not necessarily
implicate economic duress.321 Similarly, another commentator rejects the argument
that an adhesion contract with an arbitration clause is inherently coercive:
That is wrong. The consumer is free to put the pen down without signing
the form. There is no duress in the typical “adhesion” contract. A
consumer who contracts in such circumstances does so voluntarily. The

319 See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 1:20 (4th ed. 2013) (“A promise for breach of which the law neither gives a remedy nor
otherwise recognizes a duty of performance by the promisor is often called a void contract.”);
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 10 (2014) (“A void contract is no contract at all; it binds no one
and is a mere nullity.”); see also Quality Prods. & Concepts Co. v. Nagel Precision, Inc., 666
N.W.2d 251, 258 (Mich. 2003) (“Where mutual assent does not exist, a contract does not
exist.”). If the contract does not exist, there is nothing for a court to “revise.”
320

Radin, Kim, and Dawson each contend that the contracts at issue are “contracts of
adhesion.” See RADIN, supra note 4, at 82-83, 147; Kim, supra note 4, at 267, 271; Dawson,
supra note 4, at 239. The term “adhesion contract” refers to a standardized contract prepared
entirely by one party to the transaction for the acceptance of the other; such a contract, due to
the disparity in bargaining power between the draftsman and the second party, must be
accepted or rejected by the second party on a “take it or leave it” basis, without opportunity
for bargaining and under such conditions that the “adherer” cannot obtain the desired product
or service save by acquiescing in the form agreement. Steven v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 377 P.2d
284, 297 (Cal. 1962).
321 See Griffith Labs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Pomper, 577 F. Supp. 903, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(“Accordingly, even if [an employee] was asked to sign his contract with [the employer] on a
‘take it or leave it’ basis, it was not signed under duress and therefore remains valid.”).
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form may contain boilerplate terms which are unenforceable, but that does
not make the contract any less voluntary.322
The three authors have discounted that “[adhesion contracts] are not inherently
sinister and automatically unenforceable.”323 With the bulk of contracts signed in
this country being form contracts — “a natural concomitant of our mass productionmass consumer society” — any rule automatically invalidating adhesion contracts
would be “completely unworkable.”324 Because judges recognize that “the times in
which consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past,”325 the
authors’ unduly pro-claimant standard regarding arbitration agreements, which allow
relatively free exercise of rescission for duress, would destabilize large sectors of the
national economy.
M. Duress and Monopolies
Dawson notes that regional monopolies, such as public utilities or a hospital,
often use contracts with mandated arbitration clauses.326 Dawson advocates that
when a court is asked to enforce these clauses, the “judge should apply the ‘no
reasonable alternative test’ to hold that the consumer entered the contract for the
essential good under duress and therefore no contract was ever actually formed.” 327
Dawson’s concerns are not well founded. When an organization is a monopoly,
its status is not per se illegal or improper under the antitrust laws.328 The illegality
arises only where the entity has acquired or maintained its strategic position, or
sought to expand its market position, through proscribed restraints of trade.329
Furthermore, when a utility charges a consumer the rate authorized by statute or rule,
such as the directive of a public service commission, a lawful rate does not indicate
duress. This conclusion finds support in the all-encompassing principle that “[i]t is

322 Ware, supra note 7, at 201 (responding to an argument by two other commentators that
when a merchant presents to a consumer a form contract with an arbitration clause, the
consumer has “no alternative” but to sign it because the duty to arbitrate is “imposed” on the
consumer).
323

Greenpoint Credit, LLC v. Reynolds, 151 S.W.3d 868, 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004)
(quoting Hartland Comput. Leasing Corp. v. Ins Man, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989)).
324

Id. at 874-75.

325 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011). But contracts with
mandatory arbitration clauses are not always adhesive. See, e.g., Zaklit v. Glob. Linguist Sols.,
LLC, 53 F. Supp. 3d 835, 845-46 (E.D. Va. 2014) (holding that an employment contract is not
an adhesion contract); Blackburn v. Ronald Kluchin Architects, Inc., No. 89203, 2007 WL
4340861, at *4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2007) (holding that a residential construction
contract was not an adhesion contract).
326

Dawson, supra note 4, at 245.

327

Id.

328

See Hatley v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass’n, 552 F.2d 646, 651-53 (5th Cir. 1977).

329

Id.
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never duress to do that which a party has a legal right to do.”330 It is only where the
utility charges a customer an illegal exaction, such as a discriminatory rate as
compared with similarly situated consumers, will the payment reflect implied or
even express duress.331 Nothing about arbitral agreements counsels a different
approach.
N. Duress and Structures of Subordination and Social Inequalities
Dawson argues that current duress doctrine focuses excessively on economic
conditions and insufficiently on “the role law plays in creating and maintaining
structures of subordination” and social “inequalities.”332 Citing the works of
Catharine A. MacKinnon, he also criticizes courts for giving insufficient attention to
gender issues in light of the contention that the law favors “men over women.”333
Dawson places particular emphasis on the writings of Orit Gan, who contends that
judges should create a “broader, more complex duress doctrine that is sensitive to
social inequality and context and that includes aggrieved parties’ experiences and
perspectives.”334
Dawson overlooks the numerous cases that in fact deploy the same criteria he
advocates should be used to define the scope of duress. These cases stand for the
position that when deciding whether a party
was subject to duress or coercion in executing a contract, a court should
take into consideration all of the circumstances surrounding the
transaction, including, for example, the age, gender, educational level,
mental, physical, and emotional health and business acumen and
sophistication of the complaining party, as well as any prior dealings or
other relationship, whether of affinity or of consanguinity, that may exist
between the parties.335
While Dawson argues that the law fails to look beyond economic duress and
should further examine social “inequalities,”336 he omitted decisions applying the
duress defense and stating that “[s]ocial or economic pressure illegally or immorally
applied [also] may be sufficient.”337 Under these decisions, the wrongfulness of
330 Choksi v. Shah, 8 So.3d 288, 294-95 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Neuberger v. Preferred
Accident Ins. Co., 89 So. 90, 92 (Ala. Ct. App. 1921)).
331

Tex. Power & Light Co. v. Doering Hotel Co., 147 S.W.2d 897, 905 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941), aff’d, 162 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. 1942).
332

Dawson, supra note 4, at 243.

333

Id. at 243-44.

334

Gan, supra note 204, at 171.

335

LORD & WILLISTON, supra note 130, at § 71:11 (emphasis added); see also Rust v.
Drexel Firestone Inc., 352 F. Supp. 715, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
336 See Dawson, supra note 4, at 243 (citing Deborah Waire Post, Outsider Jurisprudence
and the “Unthinkable” Tale: Spousal Abuse and the Doctrine of Duress, 26 U. HAW. L. REV.
469, 483 (2004)).
337 Gibbs v. SLM Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D. Mass. 2004) (quoting Int'l Underwater
Contractors, Inc. v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 393 N.E.2d 968, 970 (Mass. App. Ct.
1979)).
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duress includes going beyond mere economics where it violates the law, a contract,
or morality.338 Indeed, as referenced above, the “gender” of the victim is a specific
judicial concern in determining the presence of duress.
The current doctrines more than adequately incorporate Dawson’s belief that an
economic duress defense should take into account both the economic and noneconomic aspects of the parties’ relationship from a broader societal perspective,
including the moral aspects of the transaction and the victim’s “experiences and
perspectives.”339 Again, nothing about arbitration agreements should exempt them
from this analysis.
CONCLUSION
“[T]he fundamental issue in duress cases is whether the statement which induced
agreement is the type of offer . . . that the law should discourage as oppressive and
thus improper.”340 The authors’ low bar for economic duress as applied to
arbitration agreements does not meet this standard. Their arguments violate
foundational legal principles, including freedom of contract, that eliminate any real
prospect that a state would adopt their doctrinal departures. The following reasons
support rejection for their proposals.
First, the FAA’s wide ranging preemption provision and the courts’ strong
enforcement of this policy render stillborn the authors’ suggested reforms to expand
(more accurately to hollow out) the common-law duress defense to the enforcement
of arbitral contracts. The existing common-law defense of duress is fair to both
offerors and offerees as it strikes the proper balance between binding the buyer to the
arbitral process he agreed to in the contract but prohibiting the seller from enforcing
a bargain if he procured it through unduly coercive tactics.
Second, the proposals to dilute the economic duress defense undermine the
predictability and reliability of contracts to the detriment of all buyers and sellers.
Economic duress is present in almost all contract bargaining. Because of that
business reality, and to avoid wholesale destabilization of various business sectors,
the law must reserve the economic duress defense for extreme and extraordinary
cases. Accordingly, this Article has established why sound public policy requires a
narrow application of the economic duress defense in arbitration cases.

338 Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., 792 N.E.2d 488, 494 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2003) (“A demand is not duress unless it is ‘wrongful’ in the sense that it violates the
law, a contract, or morality.”); see also Giesel, supra note 181, at 489 (collecting cases). A
few courts hold otherwise on whether a wrongful act includes a morally wrong act. See Dunes
Hosp., LLC v. Country Kitchen Int'l, 623 N.W.2d 484, 490-91 (S.D. 2001).
339

Dawson, supra note 4, at 244 (citing Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of
Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 171 (2013)).
340

Richards v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 62 P.3d 320, 327 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002).
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